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CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO: A LAWYER’S PERSPECTIVE
by HENRY GAO∗
On 10 November 2001, China ﬁnally acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) after
a marathon negotiation spanning 15 years. China’s membership in the WTO raises interesting
questions for both the WTO and China. For the WTO, the question is how to deal with
China—a huge country of growing importance as a major global exporter and importer but
is still in economic transition. For China, the question is how to implement the numerous
obligations in the WTO accession package. This paper sets out by reviewing China’s experience
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO. It then discusses the
beneﬁts and challenges arising from China’s WTO accession, in particular the challenges arising
from market access commitments and rules obligations. The author is of the view that whilst
the market access commitments are relatively easy to deal with, the rules obligations may have
much broader implications on both China and the multilateral trading system. This is especially
true for the “WTO-minus rights” provisions which are embodied in the Accession Protocol
and Working Party Report of China. Finally, the author analyses the actions taken by the
Chinese government since its WTO accession to implement the commitments and to deal with
the challenges, and suggests some trade policy reforms.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GATT AND WTO
As the WTO is the successor to the GATT, an account of China’s participation in the WTO
would not be complete without discussing China’s participation in the GATT. Indeed, the
origin of many of the problems which arise from China’s participation in the WTO can be
traced back to China’s experience with the GATT. To start, a brief overview of China’s
participation in the GATT1 is in order.
As one of the Allied Powers which won the Second World War, The Republic of China
(ROC) was invited, in 1946, along with 17 other countries, by the UN Secretary General to
participate in the Preparatory Committee for the UNConference on Trade and Employment.
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(EAIEL) Program, the University of Hong Kong; LLM, London; JD, Vanderbilt. This article beneﬁts from
the generous support provided by the Seed Funding for Basic Research at the University of Hong Kong. The
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1 There have been many books and articles discussing China’s accession to the WTO. An excellent survey of the
relevant materials can be found at John H. Jackson & James V. Feinerman, eds., “China’s WTO Accession:
Survey of Materials” (2001) 4 J.I.E.L. 329 at 329-335. For a good summary of the position of the Chinese
government, see Yang Guohua & Cheng Jin, “The Process of China’s Accession to the WTO” (2001) 4 J.I.E.L.
297. For a good summary of the process from the perspective of the Secretariat, see Jeffrey Gertler, “China’s
WTOAccession—The Final Countdown” inDeborahZ. Cass et al. eds.,China and theWorld Trading System:
Entering the New Millennium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 55-67. For a discussion
on some of the stumbling blocks in China’s accession process, see Kym Anderson, “On the Complexities of
China’s WTO Accession” (1997) 20(6) The World Economy at 749–772. For a good account of the several
rounds of bilateral negotiations between the US and China during the accession process, see Raj Bhala, “Enter
the Dragon: An Essay on China’sWTOAccession Saga” (2000) 15 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1469. For a discussion
on the US domestic law affecting China’sWTO accession, especially the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, see Sylvia
A. Rhodes & John H. Jackson, “United States Law and China’s WTO Accession Process” (1999) 2 J.I.E.L.
497 at 497–510.
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The Chinese government took this matter very seriously as the 17 countries (one country,
the USSR, was also invited to participate in the Committee but declined) which participated
in the work of the Preparatory Committee accounted for over 70% of world trade.2 The
Chinese government sent a strong delegation led by their veteran trade negotiator Wunz
King, the then Chinese Ambassador to Belgium.3 The Chinese delegation attended both
sessions of the preparatory committee in London and Geneva, as well as the ﬁnal confer-
ence in Havana.4 After extensive negotiations, China signed the Protocol of Provisional
Application of the GATT on 21 April 1948 and became a founding contracting party of the
GATT.5 Evidence of this now can still be found in the preamble of the GATT, which states
in the very ﬁrst paragraph that “the Republic of China”, along with 22 other countries, was
one of the founding contracting parties of the GATT.
On 1October 1949, the communists came into power and established the People’s Repub-
lic of China. The communists controlled most of the mainland, while the ROC, or the
Kuomintang government, was forced to go into exile on the outlying island of Taiwan.
This raises interesting questions under the rules on the succession of state or government in
respect of treaty obligations. Theoretically, arguments can be made for two rather different
positions.6
The interim constitution of the Peoples’ Republic, the Common Program of the Chi-
nese People’s Political Consultative Conference of 1949, seems to take a cautious approach
by stating in Article 55 that, “with respect to the treaties and agreements made by the
Kuomintang government and foreign governments, the Central People’s Government of
the Peoples’ Republic of China shall conduct examination and may either recognize, repeal,
revise or renegotiate them according to their respective contents”.7 Even though the commu-
nist government did recognise or repeal several treaties according to this provision, it never
explicitly stated how it would deal with the GATT. With the establishment of the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance in 1949 as the trade organisation of socialist countries,
and Mao Zedong’s announcement that “China will side with the socialist camp”8, it seemed
quite clear that the People’s Republic would not participate in the activities of the GATT, a
“capitalist club” boycotted by the USSR from the very beginning.9
Even though the Kuomintang government might still claim that it is the legitimate rep-
resentative of China in the GATT, in reality, it can no longer enjoy its rights or honour its
obligations under the GATT as the communists effectively control most of the territories of
China. For the government of the ROC, the contracting party status in the GATT has now
2 Liu Xiangping, “Wunz King and the GATT”, (2002)5 Twenty-First Century (web edition), online: <http://
www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/supplem/essay/0204056g.htm>.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 See, e.g., Reporters’ Notes 1 to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §208 (1987), which notes
that “[t]he international law and the practice of states as to succession have been uncertain and confused.
In recent decades several views have emerged. Some suggest that the new state succeeds to no rights or
obligations of its predecessor but begins with a tabula rasa. At the other pole is the view that a successor state
is responsible for all obligations and enjoys all rights of its predecessor. Intermediate views have distinguished
different circumstances of succession and different rights and obligations”. Thus, Restatement (Third) adopts
the view that succession has varying effects on state rights and duties. Brownlie also notes that “state succession
is an area of great uncertainty and controversy. This is due partly to the fact that much of the state practice is
equivocal and could be explained on the basis of special agreement and various rules distinct from the category
of state succession. Indeed, it is perfectly possible to take the view that notmany settled legal rules have emerged
as yet”: Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)
at 622.
7 The full text of the Common Program is available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/07/
content_2304465.htm>.
8 Mao Zedong, “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship”, online: <http://www.gdyunan.gov.cn/SGDBJT/
SGDB_GCDXYP5.htm>.
9 See Liu Xiangping, supra note 2.
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become more of a liability than a beneﬁt. On the one hand, as most of the goods from China
originate from the Mainland, the communists would reap most of the tariff beneﬁts that
the ROC has negotiated in the GATT. On the other hand, for most of the goods shipped to
mainland China from other contracting parties, the ROC would not be able to guarantee
that they will receive the preferential tariff that it had agreed to grant under the GATT.
Moreover, Taiwan’s trade was rather insigniﬁcant during the 1950s, and most of the trade
with its major trading partners already enjoyed preferential tariff under the bilateral trade
agreements anyway.10 Thus, it does not make sense for the Kuomintang government to
stay in the GATT any more. The United States was the ﬁrst to notice the potential legal
complexities that could arise from this issue.11 On 10 February 1950, the Secretary of State
of the US notiﬁed the embassy of the ROC in Washington DC that it would request the Con-
tracting Parties to terminate the Most Favoured Nation (M.F.N.) treatment for China under
the GATT as the People’s Republic of China refused to fulﬁl its GATT obligations.12 Both
Wunz King and Wellington Koo, the then ROC Ambassador to the US, suggested that the
Kuomintang government withdraw from the GATT.13 On 6 March 1950, the Kuomintang
government notiﬁed the UN Secretary General that it would withdraw from the GATT pur-
suant to Article 5 of the Protocol of Provisional Application.14 The withdrawal took effect
on May 5 of the same year.15
One may argue that Taiwan’s withdrawal was invalid because in 1950, the Kuomintang
government did not control most of China and thus was not the legitimate representative
of China. Indeed, this was the exact argument made by the People’s Republic of China
when it tried to “resume” its contracting party status more than three decades later. As
discussed earlier, however, the Mainland then never explicitly recognised the GATT as a
valid agreement nor implemented its obligations under the GATT. Moreover, the Mainland
did not challenge the validity of Taiwan’s withdrawal until more than thirty years later.
Thus, for all practical purposes, Taiwan’s withdrawal is probably valid.16
In 1971, China scored a major diplomatic victory. On 25 October 1971, the UN General
Assembly, by UN General Resolution 2758, decided “to restore all its rights to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only
legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the rep-
resentatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United
Nations and in all the organizations related to it” (emphasis added). Even though theGATT,
straightly speaking, was not a UN specialised agency like the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
United Nations (FAO), it was guided by the UN in all political decisions.17 Thus, China
10 Ying-jeou Ma, “The ROC (Taiwan)’s Entry into the WTO: Progress, Problems and Prospects”, 15 Chinese
Yearbook of International Law & Affairs (1996-97) at 36, cited in Pasha L. Hsieh, “Facing China: Taiwan’s
Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the World Trade Organization” (2005) J. World Trade 39(6) at
1195-1221, note 18.
11 See Liu Xiangping, supra note 2.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 According to this article, “[a]ny government applying this Protocol shall be free to withdraw such application,
and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the expiration of sixty days from the day on which written notice of
such withdrawal is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” See World Trade Organisation,
GATT Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th ed. (Geneva: WTO and Bernan Press, 1995)
at 1071.
15 See Liu Xiangping, supra note 2.
16 The issue became moot as China did not manage to “resume” its contracting party status before the WTO
was established and the GATT, as a de facto international organisation, no longer exists today.
17 As summarised by the Chairman of the Contracting Parties during the discussions on the observer status of
Taiwan in the GATT in 1965, “it had been the policy of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to avoid unproductive
controversies over political questions which did not bear signiﬁcantly on the many substantial questions with
which the CONTRACTING PARTIES were concerned. For this reason the CONTRACTING PARTIES had
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could have easily restored its contracting party status in the GATT by requesting the GATT
to follow UN General Resolution 2758. Unfortunately, China did not immediately make
any formal request to the GATT.18 There are several possible explanations for this. First,
China might not have realised the importance of the GATT. Secondly, China still viewed
the GATT as a “rich (capitalist) countries’ club”19 and “tools for imperialist countries to
exploit poor countries”20 and was thus reluctant to join. Thirdly, other than barter trading
with its communist brothers, China did not have much trade with the outside world at the
time. Finally, the Chinese were busy ﬁghting among themselves during the ongoing Cultural
Revolution (1967-1977) and thus took little interest in the outside world.
From the late seventies onwards, under the new leadership of the late Deng Xiaoping,
China began to reform its economic system. Drawing from the experiences of other coun-
tries, China saw foreign trade as a good way of lifting the country out of poverty and
encouraged the development of export-oriented industries. At that time, the WTO had
just completed the Tokyo Round, which brought the average tariff on industrial products
down to 4.7%. Even though they were still not very clear about how the GATT system
worked, the Chinese realised that the GATT M.F.N. tariff could greatly help to boost Chi-
nese exports On 5 July 1982, China submitted a communication to the GATT.21 In the
communication, China requested to participate as observers in the Thirty-Eighth Session
of the Contracting Parties to be held in November 1982, while noting that such request
shall be “without prejudice to the position of [China] with regard to its legal status vis-à-vis
the [GATT]”.22 This request was approved at the meeting of the Council on 21 July 1982,
where “[a] large number of representatives spoke in favour of approving the request”.23
At a Council meeting on 2 November 1982, the Chinese delegation noted in a speech that
“China is one of the Contracting Parties of the GATT. The relations between China and the
GATT are strengthening. We are willing to explore the possibilities of furthering improving
relations with the GATT”.24
After four years of observation, China made a formal request in 1986 to resume its
contracting party status in the GATT.25 In seeking resumption of its contracting party
status, the Chinese government announced three basic principles.
First, China was applying for resumption of its contracting party status, rather than
accession to the GATT as a new contracting party.26 The political message is clear: the
followed the policy expressed in Article 86 of the Havana Charter, namely to avoid passing judgment in any
way on essentially political matters and to follow decisions of the United Nations on such questions”. See
GATT Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, supra note 14 at 877.
18 After the UN restored China’s seat, China also replaced Taiwan in the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank. See Zhang Hanlin, Reviewing China’s WTO Accession (Beijing: China Economic Daily Press,
2002) at 16-18. Also, after Taiwan withdrew from the GATT in 1950, it sought and was granted observer
status in the GATT in 1965. After China restored its seat in the UN, the GATT revoked Taiwan’s observer
status in the same year. See Hsieh, supra note 10 at 1197-98.
19 Tong Zhiguang, “China’s Relationship with the WTO” in Wang Guiguo & David Smith, eds., The WTO and
China: The Road to Free Trade (Beijing: Law Press, 2002) at 232.
20 Yang Guohua, Legal Problems on China’s Accession to WTO (Beijing: Law Press, 2002) at 30.
21 People’s Republic of China: Attendance at Thirty-Eighth Session, GATT Document L/5344.
22 Ibid.
23 Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 21 July 1982, GATT Document C/M/160, at 2.
24 Yang Guohua & Cheng Jin, supra note 1 at 301.
25 China’s Status as AContracting Party: Communication from the People’s Republic of China, GATTDocument
L/6017. According to Liu Xianming, Counselor in the Chinese mission to Geneva from 1984, China originally
thought that it would have to pay the arrears of GATT membership dues if it chose to seek resumption of its
membership status, while such liability would be discharged if China joined the GATT as a new contracting
party. Later, China discovered that such membership fees could be waived as China did not have much
international trade and thus decided to seek “resumption” of its contracting party status instead. See Liu
Xianming, “I Didn’t Know That Was A Historical Moment”, Beijing Youth Daily (28 October 2001).
26 Ibid., noting that China is seeking “the resumption of its status as a contracting party to GATT” rather than
joining as a new party.
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People’s Republic deems itself to be the legitimate representative of China since 1 October
1949 and thus denies the validity of Taiwan’s withdrawal from the GATT in 1950. From a
legal perspective, this principle serves amore important purpose. At that time, theUS applied
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to its trade relationship with China, which essentially meant
that China could not enjoy normal trade relationship with the US unless the US congress
granted China normal trade relationship in its annual review.27 The public humiliation and
economic risks brought by the annual review of the US congress were enormous and China
was eager to get rid of this ordeal. If China were to join the GATT as a new contracting
party, the US could still invoke Article XXXV of the GATT to continue this practice.28
However, it would be impossible for the US to invoke this if China were only “resuming”
its contracting party status because Article XXXV could only be applied at the time of
initial tariff negotiation between the parties29 or at the time when one country became a
contracting party.
Second, China shall join the GATT as a developing country and “expects to receive
treatment equivalent to that accorded to other developing contracting parties”.30 When the
GATT was ﬁrst started, tariff negotiations were supposed to be conducted on reciprocal and
mutually advantageous bases.31 With the waves of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s,
many former colonies became independent countries and joined the GATT. However, they
regarded the GATT obligations to be onerous and argued that they should be granted special
treatments because they were at lower levels of economic development. In response to this
pressure, the GATT Contracting Parties added Part IV to the GATT in 1965, and “Decision
on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries” (the “Enabling Clause”) in 1979. The former codiﬁed the concept
of non-reciprocal preferential treatment for developing countries, which permits developing
countries to undertake lower levels of tariff concession commitments. The latter enables
developedmembers to give differential andmore favorable treatment to developing countries
without the need to grant the same to other developed countries as they would normally
be required to under the M.F.N. principle. Both provisions effectively provide developing
countries a longer timeframe to fulﬁl their GATT obligations. In addition, developing
countries also beneﬁt from the technical assistance provided by the GATT. Curiously, there
is no ofﬁcial deﬁnition for the term “developing countries” under the GATT. By convention,
it has largely been amatter of self-selection.32 At the same time, other countries can challenge
the status of a country which regards itself as a “developing country” when that country
27 Sylvia A. Rhodes & John H. Jackson, supra note 1 at 502-508.
28 Article XXXV: Non-application of the Agreement between Particular Contracting Parties:
1. This Agreement, or alternatively Article II of this Agreement, shall not apply as between any contracting
party and any other contracting party if:
(a) the two contracting parties have not entered into tariff negotiations with each other, and
(b) either of the contracting parties, at the time either becomes a contracting party, does not consent to such
application.
29 The ROC already held initial tariff negotiation with the US when the GATT entered into force.
30 China’s Status as A Contracting Party: Communication from the People’s Republic of China, supra note 25.
31 See, e.g., the preamble of the GATT, noting that the contracting parties shall “contribut[e] to these objectives
by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce”
(emphasis added).
32 During the drafting process of Part IV of the GATT, the Committee on the Legal And Institutional Framework
of GATT In Relation To Less-Developed Countries also discussed the problems concerned with identifying
the less developed contracting parties (developing countries) and deﬁning the term “less-developed contracting
party”. Two main views emerged in the Committee. On the one hand, some members considered that it was
not at this stage either necessary or feasible to attempt a deﬁnition of a less-developed contracting party and
that if a problem as to identiﬁcation arose such a problem could be dealt with at that time. On the other
hand, some members felt that it was possible by a systematic identiﬁcation of either less-developed contracting
parties or developed contracting parties to resolve the matter at a later stage. In the end, they decided to leave
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tries to leverage on special provisions available to developing countries. Apparently, by
insisting on being a developing country, China’s aim was to enjoy the special and differential
treatments for developing countries, which was what China badly needed at that time as it
tried to better integrate its own economy with the global one.
Third, China should join the GATT on the basis of tariff concessions, rather than
quantitative import commitments. First introduced during the Polish accession in 1967,
the quantitative import commitments were designed for planned economies without tar-
iff regimes.33 Traditionally, economic activities in communist countries are arranged by
state planning, which covers not only domestic production and consumption but also for-
eign trade. The state would decide the amount of exports and imports each year and, as
everything was planned by the state, there was no need for tariffs as trade measures. The
contracting parties of the GATT, most of which were capitalist countries, were worried
that the communist countries could simply choose to decide by state planning to not import
anything at all, thus nullifying the value of tariff concessions that they had negotiated with
such countries. To avoid this problem, it appeared to make more sense to require the com-
munist countries to agree to import an increasingly larger amount of goods every year. In
appearance, quantitative import commitments seem to be no different from tariff conces-
sions because a country could easily convert tariff concessions into the amount of goods
imported every year. In practice, however, because most countries usually have a cushion
between the binding tariffs and applied tariffs, the quantitative import commitment would
actually translate into a much higher tariff concession. Moreover, as the quantitative import
commitment requires increases in imports every year, the contracting party would effectively
lose the ﬂexibility needed to deal with unexpected changes in the domestic and world mar-
kets. China argued that, in its case, quantitative import commitments should not apply as it
no longer imposed state planning on exports and imports and its foreign trade was regulated
by tariffs.34 Nonetheless, because China, at least back then, still had strict foreign exchange
controls, and one would have to apply for foreign exchange before importing goods from
abroad, China’s argument does not seem very persuasive.
In March 1987, the GATT established a working party to examine China’s status.35
Reﬂecting China’s insistence on “resumption, not accession”, the working party was named
“Working Party on China’s Status as a Contracting Party”, rather than the usual “Working
Party on Accession”.36 Because the GATT does not have rules governing the resumption of
contracting party status, for all practical purposes, the working party followed the procedure
for that of an accessionworking party.37 China also accepted this as a practical compromise,
and indicated in its resumption request that it “is prepared to enter into negotiations with
GATT contracting parties”.38 Such negotiations would involve two steps: ﬁrst, bilateral
the issue to be resolved later. See Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework of GATT in Relation
to Less-Developed countries: Report of the Committee, Revision, GATT Document L/2195/REV.1.
33 Alexander Polouektov, “Non-Market Economy Issues in the WTO Anti-Dumping Law and Accession Nego-
tiations: Revival of a Two-tier Membership?” (2002) 36(1) J. World Trade at 9-11. See also K. Grzybowski,
“Socialist Countries in GATT” (1980) 28(4) Am. J. Comp. L. 539 at 547-548.
34 This would seem to be in line with the precedent set by the accession of Yugoslavia. Even though it was still
a Communist economy at the time, Yugoslavia was able to accede to the GATT in 1962 by embracing the
principles of the GATT as the basis for its trade relationships with other GATTmembers with the establishment
of a tariff regime in 1960. See Grzybowski, ibid.
35 Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 4 March 1987, supra note 23 at 9-12.
36 GATT Document L/6191.
37 As stated in its Terms of Reference, the Working Party “will examine the foreign trade regime of the People’s
Republic of China, develop a draft Protocol setting out the respective rights and obligations, provide a forum
for the negotiation of a schedule, address as appropriate other issues concerning the People’s Republic of China
and the GATT, including procedures for decision-making by the CONTRACTING PARTIES”.
38 Supra note 25. According toMr. Qian Jiadong, then Permanent Representative of China, China originally used
the word “restore” when seeking to rejoin the GATT, but then opted for the word “resume” upon discovering
that the word “restore” means “restore everything” while “resume” means “restore some of the original”.
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tariff negotiations with any contracting party that expressed interest; second, multilateral
negotiations in the working party to work out the accession protocol, annexes and the
working party report. Pursuant to this procedure, 37 contracting parties requested bilateral
negotiations with China.39 At ﬁrst, the negotiations progressed very fast. This was partly
due to the eagerness of the Chinese to get back into the GATT which they regarded as
essential in promoting the exported-oriented economic reform of China. At the same time,
the other contracting parties, especially the US and the European Communities (EC), also
wanted China to be in as early as possible so as to set an example for other communist
countries which were behind China in starting economic reforms.40 Indeed, in early 1989,
people were expecting China to enter the GATT within the year if everything went as
planned.41 Unfortunately, the hand of fate always brings surprises. After the Tiananmen
“incident” in early June, everything came to a halt. A meeting of the working party was
originally scheduled right after 4 June 1989, but when the Chinese delegation went into the
meeting room, nobody else was there.42 For the next two and half years, the working party
went into hibernation.43 It was not until 1992, when the Fourteenth National Congress
of the Communist Party made “Socialist Market Economy” the goal of the reform, that
the process resumed. Nonetheless, this did not solve all the problems. Many observers
were skeptical about the willingness of China to embrace true capitalism. For example,
Douglas Newkirk, the then Assistant US Trade Representative, was once quoted as stating
that “[t]he GATT was not written with a Socialist Market Economy in mind”.44 Also, even
though in China’s political context, a Party resolution carries much more weight than the
laws passed by its parliament, many foreigners, drawing from the experience in their own
countries, see it the other way around. It was not until the term was incorporated into the
PRC Constitution in the 1993 amendment that they began to appreciate that China was
indeed taking this seriously.
During the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, China participated in the Uruguay Round negotiations
in the hope that discussions on its status could be concluded in time for it to become a
founding member of the WTO.45 Unfortunately, the world had changed much from the
1980s. The Cold War was over, and China had lost its symbolic value to encourage changes
in the communist bloc. With the former Soviet countries also eager to join the GATT, the
terms of the accession deal for China were increasingly regarded as a template for the
other transition economies.46 Thus, the Western governments decided that China should be
subject to more rigorous terms.47 At the same time, the Uruguay Round negotiations turned
out to be much more difﬁcult than originally imagined, and most countries concentrated
their resources on the Uruguay Round rather than the China Working Party. Also, for the
ﬁrst time in history, the Uruguay Round included negotiations in the areas of trade in services
Also, he recalled that the sentence “China is prepared to enter into negotiations with GATT contracting
parties” was added at the request of the former GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel, who deemed such
phrase helpful to “reduce the worries of the Contracting Parties” and “reduce unnecessary troubles”. See
“China Opens the Door to the WTO after 15 Years”, Beijing Youth Daily (12 November 2001).
39 GATT Document L/6191/Rev.3.
40 Yang Yongzheng, “China’s WTO Accession: The Economics and Politics” (2000) 34(4) J. World Trade 77,
at 88-89.
41 Yang Guohua, supra note 1 at 42; Yang & Cheng, supra note 1 at 312; Yang Yongzheng, ibid. at 88-89.
Rhodes & Jackson, supra note 1 at 500.
42 Nicholas Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2002),
at 63; “China Opens the Door to the WTO after 15 Years”, supra note 38. See also Rhodes & Jackson, supra
note 27 at 500.
43 Jeffrey Gertler, supra note 1. See also “China’s Entry Into GATT Is Stalled by Thorny ‘Socialist Market
Economy’,” Wall Street Journal (3 March 1993).
44 Raj Bhala, supra note 1 at 1480.
45 Ibid.
46 Lardy, supra note 42 at 63.
47 Ibid.
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and trade-related intellectual property rights. Disciplines on rules on non-tariff measures
were also strengthened. As China lacked experience in these new areas, they posed new
challenges for China.
On the other hand, China itself had also changed since the 1980s. First, the 1990s saw
China’s rise as a major trader in the world, with goods “Made in China” ﬂooding many
parts of the world. Many countries, both developed and developing, felt the threat of China
not only in the world market but also in their respective domestic markets. For them,
letting China enter into the GATT and enjoy expanded market access opportunities without
demanding a pound of ﬂesh would be unthinkable. Second, with the income level of the
Chinese on the rise, more and more Western companies started to recognise the potential
of China as the largest untapped market in the world. They demanded better market access
opportunities in Chinawhichwent beyond tariff concessions, and this too required extensive
negotiation.
With difﬁculties on both fronts, even though China announced in 1994 that the sub-
stantial negotiations should be completed by the end of that year,48 when the WTO was
established on January 1 1995, the end of the negotiations was still nowhere in sight.
In December 1995, the GATT Working Party was converted into a WTO Accession
Working Party. Again, the Chinese government announced three principles of WTO acces-
sion.49 First, as an international organization, the WTO would not be complete without
the participation of China. Second, as before, China should join as a developing country.
Third, the Chinese accession should be based on a balance of rights and obligations. As we
will soon see from the detailed analysis of the terms of the Chinese accession deal below,
however, China has failed to stand by any of these principles.
In 1999 and 2000, China signed bilateral agreements with the US and EC respectively.
In November 2001, the Chinese Accession Protocol was adopted by the WTO Members
at the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. One month later, the
National People’s Congress Standing Committee of China approved the Accession Protocol
and China ﬁnally became a Member of the WTO.50
II. A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S ACCESSION TERMS
A. Beneﬁts of China’s Accession
To many observers, the biggest beneﬁts China has gained by joining the WTO are lowered
tariffs on its exports and elimination of non-tariff barriers. They argue that, by becoming a
WTO Member, China can now enjoy the M.F.N. tariff rates, which are lower than the rates
applicable to Chinese goods before the accession. Also, Chinese goodsmay no longer subject
to the many discriminatory non-tariff measures targeted at them as these would be subject
to the review of the WTO dispute settlement system. In the view of the author, however,
these two beneﬁts have been grossly exaggerated. First, even before its accession, China
had signed bilateral trade agreements with most of its trade partners. These agreements
would usually include an M.F.N. clause, which meant that China effectively enjoyed the
same M.F.N. rates its trade partners granted to other countries under other agreements,
including the WTO agreements. Second, the non-tariff barriers against Chinese ﬁrms are
real problems, but, as we will discuss later, they are far from being eliminated as a result of
China’s accession.
One considerable victory brought by China’s accession is the termination of the applica-
tion of the US Jackson-Vanik Amendment to China. Asmentioned earlier, prior to theWTO
48 Yang, supra note 1 at 45.
49 Department of WTO, Ministry of Commerce of China, “China’s WTO Accession Process”, online:<http://
chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn/column/print.shtml?/subject/WTO/subjectdd/200611/20061103868282>.
50 Pursuant to Article XIV of the WTO Agreement, “[a]n acceptance following the entry into force of this
Agreement shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of such acceptance”.
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accession, many of China’s trade partners had already granted China M.F.N. treatments.
One notable exception was the US, which, by the virtue of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,
did not automatically grant China M.F.N. treatment. Instead, an annual review was con-
ducted by the US Congress before China could be given M.F.N. treatment, even though, in
practice, M.F.N. treatment was always granted to China, even after the Tiananmen “inci-
dent” in 1989. For the Chinese government, the probability of not being able to get M.F.N.
treatment created a great deal of political and economic risk as well as public humiliation.
Because M.F.N. treatment is a fundamental principle of the WTO, however, it would be
illegal for the US to continue to apply the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to China after China’s
accession to the WTO. To ensure consistency with its WTO obligations, the US had several
options to choose from. First, the US could invoke Article XIII of the WTO Agreement
and decline to apply the WTO Agreements in its trade relationship with China. This option
would have been rather risky, considering the considerable political costs such a move
would entail both domestically and on the diplomatic relationship with China. Second, the
US could abolish the whole amendment so that it does not apply to any country. Again this
was unlikely because the US still applied the Amendment against several countries and there
would have been signiﬁcant political opposition from the US Congress against such a move.
The third option was for the US to carve out an exception for China only while keeping
the whole amendment intact. Indeed this was the option taken in the end. In anticipation
of China’s accession, the US congress adopted the US-China Relations Act in 2000, which
basically exempts China from the scope of the Amendment.51 Of course, the Act has many
strings attached. These include the establishment of a Congressional-Executive Commission
on the People’s Republic of China to monitor China’s compliance with human rights stan-
dards and development of the rule of law in China52; annual review of China’s compliance
with its WTO commitments in the WTO, as well as annual reviews by domestic institutions
such as the US Trade Representative and other government ministries.53 Interestingly, the
Act also explicitly states that “the United States should be prepared to aggressively counter
any effort by any WTO member, upon the approval of the General Council of the WTO of
the terms and conditions of the accession of the People’s Republic of China to the WTO, to
block the accession of Taiwan to the WTO.”54 No name was mentioned here, but it is all
too self-evident that this provision is targeted at China.
There are several other beneﬁts brought about by China’s accession, including partici-
pation in making the new rules for the multilateral trading system, and making use of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Both of these are available only to WTO Members.
These two beneﬁts will be discussed in the next section.
B. Challenges
As the price for its accession, China made concessions on both market access and trade
rules. These two are also where most of the challenges of China’s accession lie.
1. Market access commitments
China’s market access commitments cover both trade in goods and trade in services. For
goods, China has agreed to reduce its tariff to one of the lowest levels in the world, with
the overall tariff level to 10% by 2008.55 In the breakdown, the average tariff rate for
51 22 USC Chapter 77.
52 22 USC Sections 6911–6919.
53 22 USC Sections 6931–6951.
54 22 USC Section 6991.
55 Shi Guangsheng, “Working Together for a Brighter Future Based onMutual Beneﬁt”, in Henry Gao&Donald
Lewis, eds., China’s Participation in the WTO (England: Cameron May, 2005).
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agricultural products will be reduced to 15% and that for industrial products will be reduced
to 9.1%.56 Many observers are worried that, as a result of these tariff concessions, the
Chinese market will be ﬂooded with imported goods, with the domestic industries being
destroyed by big multi-national companies. A deeper examination reveals, however, that
the situation might not be as bad as it looks. First, even though the statutory tariff rates
in China were high prior to the accession57, the tariff collection rate, derived by dividing
the total tariff collected by the value of the total imports, was much lower. According to
Lardy, from 1994 to 2000, the average effective tariff rate in China was only 3-4%.58 This
seemingly strange phenomenon is actually easily explainable. Most of the economic miracle
in China in the last two decades of the twentieth century was built upon exports. In order
to encourage exports, the Chinese government waived the import duties for goods that were
imported as raw materials or equipments for manufacturing exports, as well as those for
the ﬁrms which are located in various special economic zones, duty-bound zones, coastal
economic development zones, and high and new technology development zones. For those
products which are subject to prohibitively high tariffs, they are mostly smuggled into China
rather than imported through the proper channels. Thus, no tariffs on them were paid at
all.59 Second, attracted by the lower costs of raw materials and labour, the tax breaks
and favorable land-use policies granted by the Chinese government to attract foreign direct
investment, as well as the huge market potential of the Chinese domestic market, more
and more multi-nationals chose to establish joint-ventures in China rather than export their
products to China from their home countries. These products would not be affected by the
reduction in tariff rates either.
Turning to speciﬁc industries, two sectors stand out as potentially vulnerable. The ﬁrst is
the automobile sector, with the tariff to be reduced from the pre-accession rate of 100% to
25% by 1 July 2005. With the fall in tariffs, many observers predicted a rise in automobile
imports after the accession. Indeed, the import data for the ﬁrst two years after accession
seem to conﬁrm this prediction. In 2002, for example, the number of imported automobiles
was 127,000, up by 76.8% over that of the previous year.60 The next year also saw a
further increase of 34.6% to 170,000 units.61 The growth slowed down considerably in
2004, however, with a total import of 177,100 units, or 2.6% growth only.62 In 2005,
there was not only no growth at all, but a reduction, with the total imports at only 160,000
units.63 Moreover, that year also saw, for the ﬁrst time in history, the total automobile
exports (172,800 units) exceed that of total imports.64 This trend continued in 2006, with
total imports and exports at 228,000 units and 342,400 units respectively.65 In the view
of the author, this conﬁrms that the hype about the threat of imported automobiles were
56 Ibid.
57 China’s average statutory tariff rate was 55.6% in 1982. This was gradually reduced during the 1990s so that
the rate in 2001 is 15.3%. See Lardy, supra note 42 at 33-35.
58 Ibid at 37-38.
59 Lardy, for example, noted that there was an 80 percent increase in the absolute value of tariff revenues collected
in 1999 when the anti-smuggling campaign of the Chinese government was in full swing. See Lardy, supra
note 42 at 38.
60 Shi Miaomiao, “China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations and Implementation of its Accession
Commitments”, in Gao & Lewis, eds., supra note 55 at 29.
61 Ibid.
62 Zhang Yi, “The Share of Imported Automobiles in Domestic Market was Further Reduced in 2004”, Xinhua
News (17 January 2005) online: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/auto/2005-01/27/content_2514097.htm>.
63 Wang Xiaokun, “Six Features of the Automobile Market in 2005”, Beijing Youth Daily (18 January 2006)
online: <http://www.tj.xinhuanet.com/2006-01/18/content_6075942.htm>.
64 China News Network, “Big Changes in the Automobile Import and Export Market in 2005: Imports
Shrank while Exports Strong”, 22 February 2006, online: <http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xiangmht/bx/
200602/20060201557050.html>.
65 “Trade in Automobile Products Cotinued High Growth in 2006”, online: <http://www.cinic.org.cn/
HTML/2005/1908/20072260065.html>.
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mostly unfounded speculations. Even the surge of imports from 2002 to 2004 might be bare
illusions, as the increased imports might simply be of those automobiles that would have
been smuggled had the tariff remain the same. Several other measures taken by the Chi-
nese government also contributed to the cooling down of imports. On May 21, 2004, the
National Development and Reform Commission issued the Automobile Industry Develop-
ment Policy.66 Article 58 of the new policy requires that automobiles can only be imported
from six designated ports, i.e., Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, Huangpu, Manzhouli and Shen-
zhen (Huanggang).67 Moreover, the same article also prohibits the duty-bound zones of
the importing ports from storing automobiles destined for entering the domestic market.68
Normally, the cost of imported automobiles includes the following: ex-factory price, tariff,
value-added tax (VAT), and consumption tax.69 As the ex-factory price is relatively stable,
the main determining factors are the import quota, tariff, VAT and consumption tax. As the
quota system has been abolished since 2005, and the tariff rate has gradually gone down, the
main determining factors are now domestic taxes and measures. Before the 2004 policy was
issued, the importers usually stored the automobiles bound for the domestic market in the
duty-bound zones.70 All they needed to pay is the storage fee of several Renminbi (RMB) per
day.71 It was only after the car is sold to the consumer that they would need to pay the tariff,
VAT and consumption tax.72 Under the new policy, however, this is no longer possible.
Instead, the importer will be required to pay the tariff from the very moment the automobile
arrives at the port.73 This has placed serious restraints on the cash position and liquidity
of the importer. According to one estimate, under the new policy, in order to import a car
worth one million RMB, the importer would also have to pay about half a million RMB
in tariff, VAT and consumption tax.74 Thus, suppose the importer has three million RMB
in cash, he could import three cars before, but only two cars now.75 Furthermore, even
after paying the tariff and taxes, the importer has no guarantee that the automobiles can be
sold. The business became more risky and the importers in turn became more cautious in
importing automobiles. Also, this risk itself is a cost, which is added to the ﬁnal price of the
car and makes the imported car even less attractive to consumers. On 26 February 2005,
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), National Development and Reform Commission
and State Administration of Industry and Commerce issued the Implementing Measures on
Management of Automobile Brand Marketing, which mandates that only those distribu-
tors with the authorisations to sell particular brands and capacity to provide the relevant
services can sell automobiles76. This has effectively driven many smaller distributors out
of business and severely restricted the marketability of many imported automobiles. In the
Tianjin Duty-bound Zone, for example, out of more than 400 automobile dealers, only 20
of them meet the qualiﬁcations under the new regulation.77 Also, many auto-makers have
66 The full text of the policy is available at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/qiche/1049/2537256.html>.
67 There is also another designated port—Alashankou of Xinjiang, but the imports for that port are limited
for automobiles originating from CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries and destined for the
self-use of the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang.
68 Art. 58.
69 Wang Hongru, “Automobile Prices Rose with the Reduction of Tariffs: Who is Determining the Price?”,
China News Week (20 March 2006) online: <http://biz.163.com/06/0320/10/2CLD4AJE00020QEN.html>.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 “Quotas Abolished, Tariffs Reduced—Why Did the Imports of Automobiles Still Drop Instead of Rise?”,
Xinhua Net (20 June 2006) online: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/auto/2005-06/20/content_3107481.htm>.
75 Ibid.
76 The full text of the regulation is available at <http://www.fdi.gov.cn/resupload/00000000000000000009/01/
200509024009.doc>.
77 “Quotas Abolished, Tariffs Reduced—Why Did the Imports of Automobiles Still Drop Instead of Rise?”,
supra note 74.
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established joint-ventures in China, which usually manufacture the same models as their
plants in other countries. Thus, it makes no sense for them to import the same cars to
China. Indeed, for the automobile sector, excess production capacity of the joint-ventures
in China seems to be a bigger problem.78 For example, the National Development and
Reform Commission estimated in 2005 that the overall production capacity of all automo-
bile manufacturers in China in 2007 might reach 14 million, while only half of them could
be sold in the domestic market.79
Agriculture was also viewed as another sector that might suffer because of China’s WTO
accession. Again, however, the problems have been exaggerated. To be sure, the arable land
per capita in China is only that of 40% of the world average, and both the land quality and
level of agricultural technological development are below those of many other countries.
As the most populous nation in the world, however, China’s comparative advantage is in
the production of labour-intensive crops, such as fruits and vegetables, livestock products,
horticulture and aquaculture products. For those crops which are of vital importance, such
as wheat, corn, rice, cotton, sugar, soybean oil, palm oil, rape-seed oil and wool, China
actually did not commit to unlimited imports as the general public might have thought.
These crops are protected by tariff-rate quotas (T.R.Q.), which greatly soften the impacts
of the potential import surges. However, it has become fashionable in the past few years to
blame the WTO for everything that goes wrong. One recent example is a report released
by Oxfam on December 7, 2005. Entitled “No Soft Landing”, this report alleged that the
plights of the Chinese cotton farmers have worsened due to China’sWTO commitments and
the US’ cotton subsidies.80 Putting aside the complicated issue of American cotton subsidies,
China’s WTO commitments actually have nothing to do with the farmers’ problems at all.
Under the terms of its accession, China’s ﬁnal T.R.Q. for cotton is only 894,000 metric ton,
to be implemented by 2004. The imports within the quota are subject to a symbolic tariff of
1%, while those exceeding the quota will be subject to a much higher tariff of 40%. Due to
wrong market forecasts by the Chinese government, however, the actual imports for 2004
reached 1.98 million ton, or about two times of the TRQ commitments.81 Moreover, China
also voluntarily reduced the tariff for imports outside the quota from 40% to 1%.82 Thus,
it is probably more appropriate to put the blame on the mismanaged policy of the Chinese
government rather than China’s WTO commitments. Many observers also argue that, with
cheap imported farm products ﬂooding the Chinese market, many Chinese farmers will be
displaced, and this could lead to social problems.83 For one thing, as discussed earlier,
the Chinese accession commitments actually include safety valves such as the T.R.Q. which
could be used to limit imports. Moreover, even though Chinese farmers may not be able to
compete on land-intensive crops, they could do very well on labor-intensive crops. Another
problem with these studies is that they use out-dated data. Many studies cite 900 million
as the number of farmers in China.84 While many people may still have their ofﬁcial status
or “Hu Kou” (residence permit) as farmers, in reality, a lot of them no longer live in the
rural areas or engage in agriculture activities any more. Instead, many of them now work as
peasant workers in big cities or work in factories or businesses that are established in the very
78 See, e.g., Lardy, supra note 42 at 111–113; and Nicholas R. Lardy, “China and the Asian contagion”, (Jul/Aug
1998) 77(4) Foreign Affairs 78.
79 “Alarm in the Automobile Sector”, MoneyChina (13 June 2006) online: <http://www.moneychina.cn/d/
2005/06/13/1118613752003.html>.
80 The full report is available at <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/bp83_china_cotton.htm>.
81 “Reasons for the “Reverse Control” of Agricultural Trade”, Caijing Magazine, 14 April 2005, online: <http://
ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20050414/13451517877.shtml>.
82 Ibid.
83 Li Shantong & Zhai Fan, “The Impact on the Chinese Economy of China’s WTO Accession” (2000) 3
Forecasting at 8.
84 See e.g., Sylvia Ostry, “WTO Membership for China: To be or Not To Be—Is That The Answer?” in China
and the World Trading System: Entering the New Millennium, supra note 1 at 38.
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villages they live. In the author’s hometown, for example, some 40 to 60 percent of the rural
population now regularly lives in the cities. It is no wonder that no accurate results may be
reached from the use of such ﬂawed data.85 In the view of the author, the biggest problem
in rural China is the long-standing practice of the “agri-industrial scissor price differential”,
which involves the undervaluation of agricultural prices relative to industrial prices and is
a rip-off of farmers in support of the industrial development of the nation. Moreover, the
farmers also had to pay an agricultural tax. The elimination of the agri-industrial scissor
price differential and the agricultural tax86, combined with agricultural subsidies to farmers,
are the best way to solve many of the problems that might emerge in implementing China’s
WTO commitments on agriculture.
In addition to trade in goods, China has also made extensive commitments in its ser-
vices sectors. Mattoo, for example, observes that China’s services commitments, in terms
of both the width of coverage and depth of market-opening, are generally higher than other
WTO Members and praises China’s commitments under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) as “the most radical services reform program negotiated in the WTO”.87
Overall, the services sectors in China are less developed than those of most developed coun-
tries and vulnerable to foreign competition. Of all sectors, ﬁnancial services might stand
out as one that is probably the most vulnerable. On the one hand, the foreign ﬁnancial
institutions are generally more diversiﬁed in their ﬁnancial holdings, have more experience
in credit analysis and structuring ﬁnancial products. Even though their physical networks
are smaller than those of their domestic counterparts, such limited presence still serves them
well as they focus on only the best clients. On the other hand, most domestic banks rely
heavily on conventional loans and thus lack diversiﬁcation in their investment portfolios.
Many domestic banks, especially the state banks, are required to assume policy roles such
as providing loans to state-owned enterprise (S.O.Es) and maintaining physical networks in
small towns and cities even though such activities might not be sound business decisions.
They also lack the management skills and product development capacities in order to run the
businesses efﬁciently. In conclusion, foreign banks pose signiﬁcant threats to the domestic
banks. Of course, as the speciﬁc commitments for services are generally made on a “posi-
tive listing” basis, and Members have the option of choosing from the whole spectrum of
“no limitation” to “unbound” in scheduling their commitments, the foreign banks are not
going to conquer the Chinese market overnight. Instead, most of China’s commitments
for ﬁnancial services will not kick in until 5 years after China’s accession. Even after the
transition period, China can still impose other restrictions in the activities of foreign banks
so long as they qualify as “prudential regulations”, a term vaguely deﬁned in the GATS
Annex on Financial Services as “measures …for the protection of investors, depositors, pol-
icy holders or persons to whom a ﬁduciary duty is owed by a ﬁnancial service supplier, or to
ensure the integrity and stability of the ﬁnancial system”. The loose deﬁnition of “prudential
measures” gives national authorities a lot of leeway in designing ﬁnancial regulations. A
good example of a prudential regulation is the Regulation on the Administration of Foreign
Financial Institutions, which was promulgated by the State Council on 12 December 2001,
85 Lardy estimated that the absolute number of workers employed in agriculture was only 354 million in 1999.
Moreover, the number has fallen by an average of more than 4 million annually in the 1990s. Thus, the
Development Research Center’s projection of loss of about 11 million farm jobs in the ten years after China’s
accession is actually a much slower rate of reduction than what would happen even without the accession.
See Lardy, supra note 42 at 109-110, 114.
86 With effect from 1 January 2006, the agricultural tax has been abolished in China. See The Nineteenth Session
of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress, Decision on Abolishing the Regulations
on Agricultural Tax, online: <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/ﬂfg/2005-12/30/content_142025.htm>.
87 Aaditya Mattoo, “China’s Accession to the WTO: The Services Dimension”, (2003) 6 (2) Journal of
International Economic Law 300. .
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one day after China’s WTO accession.88 Article 7 of the Regulations requires foreign banks
which want to open branches in China to maintain a capital adequacy ratio of 8%. This
Regulation is supplemented by a set of Implementing Rules issued in 2004, which state that
the capital adequacy ratio shall be calculated on the basis of the capital of the branches in
China only rather than the bank’s global capital.89 In effect, this forces a foreign bank either
to allow its branches in China to retain their earnings in China, which could then be counted
towards its capital, or to contribute more capital to its Chinese branches which may limit
its ability to expand its business in China.90 Either way, the foreign banks would have to
lock up more capital in their China operations and cannot remit most of their proﬁts out of
China. Article 5 of the Regulations requires foreign banks to contribute as operating capital
at least 100 million RMB to its branch in China. Article 17 of the Implementing Rules fur-
ther clariﬁes that the minimum operating capital requirement applies on a branch by branch
basis, which further increases the ﬁnancial burden of foreign banks conducting business in
China. Article 24 of the Regulation also requires foreign banks to maintain at least 30% of
their operating capital in the form of interest-bearing deposits, which, according to Article
68 of the Implementing Rules, shall be saved in domestically-owned commercial banks in
China. While this is a good way to get business for the local Chinese banks, it further limits
the abilities of foreign banks to compete against local banks.
In summary, the market access challenges in both trade in goods and trade in services
may not be as great as people think. Moreover, as noted by Lardy in his study, even if there
were short-term adjustment problems, in the long run, they might well be alleviated by the
efﬁciency gains resulting from more competition and better allocation of resources brought
about by the opening of the market.91 Instead, the bigger problem lies in the area of rules.
2. Rules issue
China’s rules commitments can be divided into two groups: WTO-plus obligations, i.e.,
obligations that are beyond those normally required of WTO Members; and WTO-minus
rights, i.e., rights that are below those generally enjoyed by WTO Members.
The WTO-plus obligations include the following. First, China is required to translate all
foreign trade laws and regulations into one of the WTO ofﬁcial languages92, i.e., English,
French or Spanish, while there is no general obligation for other WTO Members to do so.
Second, China is required to have its trade policies reviewed by the WTO every year since
its accession. There will be a total of nine such reviews, with the ﬁrst to the eighth of such
reviews conducted annually after 2001 and a ﬁnal review no later than the tenth anniversary
after China’s accession. Under the normal Trade Policy ReviewMechanism, however, China
would only need to be reviewed every four years at the time of its accession.93 Third, China
is required to grant national treatment to foreign individuals, enterprises and foreign-funded
enterprises94, while the WTO National treatment clause only cover measures applicable to
88 Regulations on the Management of Foreign Financial Institutions, which is available at <http://www.
investchina.com.cn/market/zcxx/418494.htm>.
89 Article 69, Implementing Rules of the Regulations on the Management of Foreign Financial Institutions,
available at <http://www.chinacourt.org/ﬂwk/show1.php?ﬁle_id=95606>.
90 Lardy, supra note 42 at 119.
91 Ibid. at 119-122.
92 Para. 334 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001,
online: <http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm> (Working Party Report).
93 Section C of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Annex 3 to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#annex3>.
94 Section 3 of the Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Decision of 10 November 2001,
WT/L/432, online: <http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm> (Accession Protocol).
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products. As these provisions have been discussed rather extensively by other scholars95,
the author will not pursue them further here.
The WTO-minus rights provisions include the following. First, as China is a country
with a long history of government planning in economic development, many WTO Mem-
bers suspect that the Chinese government still interferes with micro-economic activities and
thus doubt the reliability of market data in China. Thus, Section 15(a) of the Accession
Protocol allows WTO Members to treat China as a non-market economy in anti-dumping
investigations. The ﬁrst step in anti-dumping investigations involves the determination of
the existence of dumping, which is derived by comparing the export price and normal value
of the product in question. Normal value is usually the sales price of the product in the
exporting country. This provision, however, would allow WTO Members to disregard the
domestic sales price in China and use a proxy price from some surrogate country or a con-
structed price. Because China’s comparative advantages mostly derive from the low costs
of its factors of production, this provision makes it more likely for other WTO Members to
arrive at a higher normal value and thus makes it easier for them to reach a determination of
the existence of dumping. This mechanism is available to WTO Members for up to ﬁfteen
years after China’s Accession. Sub-section (b) of Section 15 also includes a similar provision
applicable to the determination of the existence of subsidy beneﬁts under the Subsidy and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement. Again, here, the domestic market conditions
in China will be ignored and the alternative benchmarks in surrogate countries will be used.
Even though this provision has been rarely invoked since China’s accession, it is poten-
tially more damaging than Section 15(a) of the Accession Protocol (i.e., the one relating to
anti-dumping) as S.O.Es by deﬁnition receive many government subsidies. Also, there is
no end date for the application of the alternative benchmark mechanism. Thus, at least
theoretically speaking, it could be invoked even one hundred years after China’s accession.
Also, as China has become the biggest producer of many products in the world, many
WTO Members fear that their markets will be ﬂooded with products “Made in China”
and their domestic producers will be destroyed. Even though Article XIX of the GATT
and the Safeguards Agreement provide for the possibility of the application of safeguard
measures to deal with sudden increases of imports, many Members worry that that the
normal safeguard measures might not be enough to deal with the China threat. Thus,
China had to agree to two special safeguard mechanisms in its accession package. The ﬁrst
is the transitional product-speciﬁc safeguard mechanism (T.P.S.S.M.) as provided under
Article 16 of the Accession Protocol. Compared with the normal safeguard mechanism
under the WTO, the T.P.S.S.M. includes many unique features. First, the T.P.S.S.M. may
be triggered by “market disruption”, which is deemed to exist so long as imports are “a
signiﬁcant cause of material injury”, rather than causing “serious injury”, as would have
been required under the Safeguards Agreement. Second, while the WTO rule requires that
safeguardmeasures shall be applicable to products from all countries on anM.F.N. basis, the
T.P.S.S.M. speciﬁcally targets products from China only. Third, under the normal WTO
rule, if a safeguard measure is taken for relative increase of imports, the affected export
Members are allowed to retaliate immediately. The T.P.S.S.M. provides, however, China
would have the right to retaliate only if such measure remains in effect for more than two
years. Fourth, while the Safeguard Agreement explicitly prohibits any safeguard measure to
be applicable for more than eight years, the T.P.S.S.M. allows the safeguard measures to be
applied for “such period as may be necessary”, which implied that it might exceed the 8-year
limit. Fifth, the T.P.S.S.M. also includes a trade diversion clause, which allows any third
WTO Member that fears that the application of the T.P.S.S.M. by any other WTO Member
might divert the Chinese products to its own market to invoke the T.P.S.S.M. without any
95 See Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal
System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol” (2003) 37(3) J. World Trade 491.
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need to conduct any investigation. This means that, once the T.P.S.S.M. is invoked by any
WTO Members, it would create a domino effect and all the other 148 WTO Members
could, at least in theory, invoke the T.P.S.S.M. against the Chinese products affected. The
T.P.S.S.M. is available for use for 12 years after China’s accession.
In addition to the general safeguard mechanism mentioned above, textile products were
also singled out as the one that has the most potential for causing damage. Thus, in addition
to theT.P.S.S.M., whichmight be applied against any kind ofChinese products, another safe-
guard mechanism which speciﬁcally targets textile products from China was also included
in the accession package. The threshold for invoking this special textile safeguard is even
lower than that of the T.P.S.S.M.: it does not even have to be “material injury”, instead,
“market disruption threatening to impede the orderly development of trade in these prod-
ucts” is enough. Once it is invoked, the Member applying the measure could limit Chinese
textile imports to a level of 7.5% (6% for wool products) above the amount entered during
the previous year. Also, China is deprived of the right to retaliate entirely, not even for
safeguard measures taken in response to relative increases. This measure is available for use
until the end of 2008.
Even though China claims itself to be a developing country, and its economy shares many
characteristics in commonwith those of many transition economies, China have been denied
many of the rights available to WTO Members which are developing countries or transition
economies. For example, China has agreed, under Section 10(2) of the Accession Protocol,
that its subsidies to S.O.Es will be regarded as speciﬁc subsidies under the SCM Agreement,
thus making them actionable even without the “speciﬁcity” element as would normally be
required under the SCM Agreement. Similarly, according to the commitment made under
paragraph 171 of the Working Party Report, China agreed that it would not invoke the
special treatment for developing countries under Article 27(13) of the SCM Agreement,
which means that the direct forgiveness of debts by the Chinese government in privatisation
programmes would also be actionable. Furthermore, with respect to agricultural subsidies,
China agreed, under paragraph 235 of the Working Party Report, that its de minimus
exception for agricultural supports would be capped at 8.5%. Even though this is higher
than the general de minimus level of 5% for all WTO Members, it is lower than the 10%
which is available to developing countries.96
These China-speciﬁc provisions raise some really difﬁcult legal questions. First, what
is the status of these provisions in the WTO legal system? The legal validity of some of
the provisions seems to be rather questionable. Take the special textile safeguard measure
for example: China is required to consult with the Member invoking the clause to limit
its own exports and to hold its textile exports during the consultation period. This is
the very kind of measures that have been explicitly prohibited under Article 11(b) of the
Safeguard Agreement, i.e., grey area measures which include voluntary export restraints,
orderly marketing arrangements or other similar measures.97 One might argue that the
prohibition here does not apply to the Chinese Accession Protocol because Article 11(c)
states that the entire Safeguards Agreement does not apply to “measures sought, taken or
maintained …pursuant to protocols …concluded within the framework of GATT 1994”.
The author wishes to point out, however, the Chinese Accession Protocol, legally speaking,
is not concluded “within the framework of GATT 1994” as the old Accession Clause,
Article XXXIII of the GATT, has been replaced by Article XII of the Marrakech Agreement.
Thus, it is a protocol concluded within the framework of the Marrakech Agreement, and,
as such, does not fall under the carve-out of Article 11(c) of the Safeguards Agreement.
96 Article 6.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1A of the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,
online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#annex3>.
97 For a discussion on the historical background on the prohibition of Voluntary Export Restraints, see
Matsushita et al., eds., The WTO: Law, Practice and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at
209-216.
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Second, many of these provisions are ambiguous and nobody is quite sure exactly how
they work. In a recent article, for example, two senior ofﬁcials in the MOFCOM argued
that the following questions have to be addressed before the product-speciﬁc safeguard
mechanism could be properly applied by other WTO Members against China.98 First, what
is the deﬁnition of “market disruption” and “trade diversion”?99 Second, even though
the special safeguard measures could be applicable solely against China, should the parallel
imports from other WTO Members also be considered by the importing Member?100 Third,
what is the relationship between the ordinary safeguard measures and the Special Safeguard
Measures? Should the standards and procedures stipulated under Article XIX of the GATT
and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards be applicable to the Special Safeguard Measures
where the latter is silent?101 Fourth, should the other WTO Members be free to choose
between the Special Safeguard Measures and other trade remedy measures or should they
only be allowed to invoke the Special Safeguard Measures as a last resort when no other
trade remedymeasures, such as antidumping, countervailingmeasures or ordinary safeguard
measures, are applicable?102 Similarly, the Special Textile Safeguard Mechanism is also
fraught with ambiguities. This is illustrated in the recent spat between the Chinese and US
governments as to whether the US had properly satisﬁed the requirements under paragraph
242 of the Working Party Report before applying special textile safeguard measures against
Chinese textile products.
Even though these terms are discriminatory and China might not like them, they are
already part of China’s accession package. Theoretically, China could try to have the WTO
amend the terms of its accession103, or waive some of its obligations104. In reality, how-
ever, neither is an attractive option as the WTO decision-making mechanism has essentially
become paralyzed in recent years. Instead, China will have to learn to live with these terms
for a long period after its accession. In the next part, the author will discuss how China has
dealt with these obligations since its accession.
III. CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Accession to theWTO brought many challenges to China, and China took various actions in
response to these challenges. Such challenges and responses are reﬂected at several different
levels, i.e., the domestic level, the bilateral/regional level, and the multilateral level. In this
section, the author will assess China’s participation in the multilateral trading system at all
these levels.
A. The Domestic Level
China’s WTO obligations include two main components: The Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the WTO (The WTO Agreement) and the annexed Multilateral Trade Agreements,
98 Yuqing Zhang & Guohua Yang, “China as a WTO Member in the First Two Years”, in Mitsuo Matsushita
& Dukgeun Ahn, eds., WTO and East Asia: New Perspectives (England: Cameron May, 2004) at 322-324.
At the time of the writing of the article, Yuqing Zhang was the Director General of the Department of Treaty
and Law at the MOFCOM, while Guohua Yang was the Director for WTO Legal Affairs of the Department
of Treaty and Law. In those capacities, they were the senior legal advisors to the MOFCOM.
99 Ibid. at 323.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Pursuant to Article X of theMarrakech Agreement Establishing theWorld Trade Organization, 15 April 1994,
online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm> (Marrakech Agreement).
104 Pursuant to Article IX of the Marrakech Agreement.
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and the Protocol of Accession of China and the schedules annexed thereto. Under Arti-
cle XVI of the WTO Agreement, China is required to “ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements”. Similarly, under Section 2 of its Accession Protocol, China’s “local regula-
tions, rules and other measures of local governments at the sub-national level shall conform
to the obligations undertaken in the WTO Agreement and this Protocol”.
Even though both the WTO Agreement and the Accession Protocol require China to
ensure its laws to “conform” to theWTOobligations, neither prescribes a particular method
for achieving such conformity. Generally speaking, there are twoways to apply international
treaties: apply them directly by adopting them directly into the domestic legal system, or
apply them indirectly by enacting domestic legislations based on the contents of the treaties,
or revising domestic legislations accordingly. Different countries take different approaches.
In the case of China, neither the Constitution nor the Lawon the Procedure of the Conclusion
of Treaties105 speciﬁes the general approach that should be taken. Instead, China’s practice is
rather inconsistent in this regard. For example, Article 142 of the General Principles of Civil
Law explicitly states that “in case of a conﬂict between the provisions in the international
treaties China concludes or accedes to and the provisions in the domestic civil laws of China,
the provisions in the international treaties should be applied, except where China has made
a reservation.” On the other hand, some other treaties have to be transformed into domestic
legislation before they can be applied. For example, the Law on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone and Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf are
domestic legislation passed in China to give effect to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
In China’s WTO Working Party Report, China agreed to the following:
All individuals and entities could bring to the attention of central government
authorities cases of non-uniform application of China’s trade regime, including its
commitments under the WTO Agreement and the Draft Protocol. Such cases would
be referred promptly to the responsible government agency, and when non-uniform
application was established, the authorities would act promptly to address the situ-
ation utilizing the remedies available under China’s laws, taking into consideration
China’s international obligations and the need to provide a meaningful remedy.106
(emphasis added)
This seems to suggest that the WTO obligations are directly applicable in China with-
out the need of being transformed into domestic legislation ﬁrst. Of course, as the WTO
Agreements are treaties entered between governments, they do not provide direct remedies
for individuals. That is why the same paragraph also states that the only remedies available
are those prescribed under domestic laws.
In August 2002, the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court of China issued
Rules on Several Issues on Trying Administrative Case on International Trade.107 According
to Rule 7, the courts shall apply the domestic laws and regulations of China in trying
such cases. While the rule itself does not explicitly rule out the possibility of applying
WTOAgreements directly, Justice Li Guoguang, a Deputy President of the Supreme People’s
Court, has interpreted this rule to mean that WTO Agreements cannot be directly applied
105 Adopted at the 17th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress on Decem-
ber 28, 1990, promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on December
28, 1990, and effective as of the same date.
106 Para. 75 of the Working Party Report. This commitment is incorporated in the Accession Protocol by the
virtue of Para. 342 and Section 1(2) of the Accession Protocol.
107 Fashi [2002] 27, adopted by the 1239th Meeting of the Trial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court of
China on 27 August 2002.
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in China.108 According to Justice Li, ﬁrst of all, private individuals or ﬁrms cannot directly
invokeWTOAgreements to bring an action or defend themselves in court; second, the courts
shall not directly apply the WTO Agreements as the legal basis for their judgments.109 To
support his argument, Li also cited Paragraph 67 of the Working Party Report of China,
which states that “the WTO Agreement would be implemented by China in an effective
and uniform manner through revising its existing domestic laws and enacting new ones
fully in compliance with the WTO Agreement”. In the view of the author, however, there
are several problems with this line of argument. First of all, while Paragraph 67 can be
interpreted to mean that transforming WTO Agreements into domestic Chinese laws is one
option, this does not in anyway suggest that direct application is not another option. Indeed,
the Working Party Report never explicitly stated that China would not directly apply the
WTO Agreements. Second, even if assuming, arguendo, Paragraph 67 means that WTO
agreements can only be transformed but not adopted, because Paragraph 67 is not included
in the list of paragraphs in paragraphs incorporated into the Accession Protocol in Paragraph
342, it is not part of the terms of China’s accession. Third, as mentioned above, Paragraph
75 of the Working Party Report explicitly recognises the rights of individuals and entities to
invoke China’s commitments under the WTO Agreement and the Draft Protocol, denying
them such rights would probably violate China’s accession commitments.
Interestingly, even though Justice Li insisted that the Rules prohibit the direct application
of WTO Agreements, he also recognised that, when the provisions of the relevant domestic
laws and regulations could be subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, and one
interpretation is consistent with the provisions of an international treaty that China has
concluded or acceded to, such interpretation shall be adopted.110 This, however, only
solves part of the problem, i.e., when there is a reasonable interpretation of the law or
regulation that is consistent with WTO Agreements. Obviously, when all the reasonable
interpretations available are inconsistent with WTO Agreements, the WTO Agreements will
not be applied. This would probably amount to a violation of China’s WTO obligations.
Even though China is probably legally obliged to make the WTO Agreements directly
applicable, in practice, this is hardly a workable option as the average standard of judges
in China is much lower than that of their counterparts in the West. Many of them found
their way into the judiciary when they were placed into the courts by the Party as reward for
their loyal service in the People’s Liberation Army.111 Many have received no formal legal
training at all and this is especially true among the senior judges as the legal system was
utterly destroyed during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Thus, for many of
them, it is quite a challenge to effectively master the rules of the WTO Agreement, which is
largely modeled after the Western legal systems and is much more complicated than Chinese
domestic civil and criminal laws. Comparatively speaking, the bureaucrats at the ministries
of the central government are better educated and generally are better able to understand
the WTO Agreements. Thus, after its accession to the WTO, China launched an extensive
campaign to revise old laws and regulations or enact new ones. Amidst this huge legislative
exercise, the most important law is the Foreign Trade Law of China, which was ﬁrst enacted
in 1994 to set out the basic framework for China’s foreign trade regime.
With the changing trading environment, China revised the Foreign Trade Law in 2004,
which became effective on 1 July 2004.112 As an attempt to revamp the foreign trade regime,
108 Tian Ji & Lin Zi, “Judicial Review on Administrative Cases on International Trade: Chinese Courts Will Start
to Accept Administrative Cases Brought by Foreigners” People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) (7 September 2002)
at 3, online: < http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper39/7185/694081.html>.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid. See also Rule 9.
111 See He Weifang, “Army Veterans Enters the Court”, Southern Weekend (2 January 1998).
112 Adopted at the 8th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on April 6,
2004, and effective as of July 1, 2004.
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this revision brought substantial changes to the law. Out of the forty-four articles of the
original law, only six articles (Articles 7, 15, 23, 33, 37 and 43) remain unchanged. Also,
three entirely new chapters were added, with the result that the law now has 70 articles in
eleven chapters. While some of the revisions are only rephrasing of the original terms (for
example, the original Article 13 “[a]n organization or an individual that does not acquire a
license for carrying out foreign trade activities may entrust a foreign trade operator as agent
to handle the ad hoc trade operations within the ad hoc scope of business” was changed
to Article 12 “[f]oreign trade dealers may accept the authorization of others and conduct
foreign trade as an agent within its scope of business”), most of the changes go far beyond
mere paraphrasing. As noted by many commentators, a lot of the revisions were made to
implement China’s WTO commitments. In the author’s view, however, the more important
revisions are the ones made to protect China’s own trade interests.
1. WTO-compliance provisions
Among the provisions to comply with China’s WTO obligations, the most important one
is the liberalisation of foreign trading rights. Before China’s accession to the WTO, only
a limited number of Specialized Foreign Trading Companies and some Sino-foreign Joint
Foreign Trading Companies had trading rights. In addition, some manufacturing ﬁrms,
research institutes and foreign invested enterprise have also been granted special approval
for exporting their own products and importing technologies, equipments, components and
raw materials for their own production needs.
During the negotiations leading to China’s accession to the WTO, many Members urged
China to remove its restrictions on trading rights, which they regard as barriers to keep
foreign products out of the Chinese market. After extensive negotiations, China agreed to
the following commitments with regard to trading rights:
China shall progressively liberalize the availability and scope of the right to trade, so
that, within three years after accession, all enterprises in China shall have the right
to trade in all goods throughout the customs territory of China …Such right to trade
shall be the right to import and export goods.
Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, all foreign individuals and enter-
prises, including those not invested or registered in China, shall be accorded treatment
no less favourable than that accorded to enterprises in China with respect to the right
to trade.113
In line with this commitment, Chapter 2 of the Foreign Trade Law was revised, with the
most extensive revisions on Articles 8 and 9. Under Article 8 of the old Law, only juridical
persons and other organisations can apply for trading rights. The newly-revised Article 8
expands the category to include private individuals. It is worth noting that under the old
regime for the granting of trading rights, private individuals in China cannot get trading
rights. Under the terms of its Accession Protocol, China agreed to grant trading rights
to foreign individuals but not Chinese individuals. Thus, strictly speaking, China has no
obligation under its WTO commitments to grant private Chinese individuals trading rights.
During the drafting process of the new Foreign Trade Law, there was some debate as to
whether private Chinese individuals should be granted foreign trading rights as the Chinese
government was concerned that the liberalization of foreign trading rights could lead to
political instabilities when private individuals begin to import foreign products. In the
end, the Chinese government decided to grant private Chinese individuals trading rights to
avoid charges of granting “supra-national treatments” to foreign individuals. After the new
Foreign Trade Law became effective, however, few individuals applied for foreign trading
113 Section 5 of the Accession Protocol.
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rights. The main reasons are ﬁrst, under current Chinese law, a person doing business as a
sole proprietorship will have to assume unlimited liability, while the corporate form could
provide a way to shield and limit liabilities; second, the international trade business typically
requires high investment, an established client base abroad and good distribution channels,
which are conditions which an individual normally cannot meet.
Under Article 9 of the old Law, foreign traders must satisfy several requirements and
seek examination and approval from state authorities before they are granted foreign trade
rights. The new Law replaces this with a simple registration procedure, as pursuant to
China’s commitments.114
Another example is Article 15 in the new Law, which is a newly-added provision to
implement China’s commitment to “bring its automatic licensing system into conformity
with Article 2 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures”.115
2. Provisions to protect China’s trade interests
In the author’s view, the more interesting developments in the new Foreign Trade Law
are the provisions designed to protect China’s trade interests. These provisions show that
China is no longer content to passively implement the commitments that have been (at least
according to some observers) forced upon China during its accession process. Instead, with
more familiarity with the rules of the game of the multilateral trading system, China has
started trying to use the rules, especially the exceptions to the general principles of theWTO,
to protect its trade interests.
Some of these provisions appear to be rather harmless. For example, Article 54 of the
new Law states that the government shall establish a foreign trade public information service
system to provide information to foreign traders and the general public. As most Chinese
ﬁrms only started their international expansion in recent years, many of them found it very
difﬁcult to obtain information about foreign markets. This new public information service
system can help them to get the necessary information. Also, most of the new entrants to
the international markets are small and medium sized enterprises. Collectively, they have
become the largest contributor to the Chinese economy. In 2003, for example, they provided
55.6% of China’s GDP and 62.3% of China’s export.116 At the same time, however, as
each of them only has limited resources, it is especially difﬁcult for them to explore new
markets abroad. Thus, Article 58 of the new Law requires the state to support and promote
foreign trade by small and medium-sized ﬁrms, which are deﬁned as those ﬁrms with annual
export volume of less than 15 million US dollars.
In recent years, with its low costs of production and huge export volumes, China has
become the primary target of various trade remedies actions taken by countries around the
world. These trade remedies measures seriously limit the export growth of Chinese ﬁrms.
In some serious cases, an entire Chinese industry may be wiped out of the particular export
market due to such trade remedies measures. Thus, Article 49 of the new Law establishes
a foreign trade early-warning system to deal with emergencies in foreign trade. Unlike sim-
ilar mechanisms in other countries, this early-warning system monitors not only changes
in imports into the domestic market, but also changes in the exports to foreign markets.
Indeed, as illustrated by the ﬁrst Trade Remedy Measures Pre-Warning System established
in Shanghai, exports seem to be the primary concern of the Chinese government. There are
several possible scenarios in which such a pre-warning system might be useful. First, when
a trade remedy measure is taken by a foreign government, the system can warn exporters to
shift their exports to other countries or switch to the production of products which are not
subject to the particular measure. Second, when some exporters sell their products in the
114 Para. 84 (a) of the Working Party Report.
115 Para. 136 of the Working Party Report.
116 Zhao Cheng & Liu Zheng, “Small and Medium Size Enterprises Account for Half of the Economy”, Economic
Reference Daily (9 July 2004), online: <http://ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/roll/20040916/00531026269.shtml>.
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export market at prices that are so low that there is a risk of triggering anti-dumping inves-
tigations, the government, or the relevant trade association, could step in to have the ﬁrm
raise its prices. Third, when the total volume of exports of all the exporting ﬁrms increases
at a rate that is so high that it might trigger a safeguard investigation, the government, or
the relevant trade association, could arrange for the ﬁrms to better coordinate their export
volumes so as to reduce the total volume of exports. Since the coming into force of the new
Foreign Trade Law took effect, China has established early warning system for three key
industries,i.e., automobile, chemical fertilizer and steel industries.
(a) Trade RemedyMeasures: Compared with the provisions mentioned above, some other
provisions take a more aggressive approach to defend the interests of Chinese ﬁrms in both
domestic and international markets. For example, under the new Chapter VIII, China can
take a host of so-called trade remedies measures to address injuries to domestic indus-
tries caused by foreign imports. These include the traditional categories, i.e., anti-dumping
measures, subsidy countervailing measures, and safeguards.
It is ironic to see that China, the primary target of trade remedies measures, has taken
a close interest in making use of these very trade remedies measures itself against foreign
competition. What is more interesting, however, is that China is able to take advantage of
all these latest innovations in the trade remedies game as it was a late-comer and was eager
to learn. Thus, China’s arsenal of trade remedies measures is much more advanced than
that of many other WTO Members.
For example, under Article 42 of the new Law, even in cases where the dumping occurs
in a third country, but causes injuries to the exports of Chinese domestic industries, China
could request the government of the third country to take appropriate actions, including
antidumping measures. Even though Article 14 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement also
envisages such possibility, such heightened extra-territorial protection would only make
sense for Members with signiﬁcant export interests in a given foreign market. Thus, many
smaller Members do not have such mechanisms in their domestic legislation. Even for larger
Members, not all of them have such a mechanism. For example, the EU does not have this
mechanism in its anti-dumping regulation.117 In this sense, China is much more aggressive
than many other WTO Members.
Article 45 is also an interesting provision. It provides for the possibility of safeguard
measures for services, i.e., “if any services are being imported into China from the services
providers of other countries or regions in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten
injury to the domestic industries which offer the like or directly competitive services, the
state may take necessary remedy measures to reduce or eliminate such injury or threat”.
Even though Article X of the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS) mandates
the Members to hold negotiations on emergency safeguard measures and have the result of
such negotiations enter into effect within three years after the establishment of the WTO,
the WTO Members have not been able to reach any agreement on this issue due to the
difﬁculties with the Doha Round as a whole. In this context, it is unclear whether China
would be allowed to take safeguard measures against services imports. On the one hand,
one might argue that such safeguard measures would not be allowed, as Article XVI.2
of the GATS explicitly prohibits this kind of measures unless they have been speciﬁed in
the schedule. On the other hand, one can also argue that, as Article X.2 of the GATS
provides temporary mechanisms for Members to modify or withdraw their commitments
before the conclusion of the safeguard negotiations, the legislative intent is that there should
be a safeguard mechanism available, and before such safeguard mechanism is available, the
Members should be given an opportunity to revise their commitments. In an ofﬁcial guide
117 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Community, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/
anti_dumping/legis/adgreg01a.htm>.
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to the new Law, China defends this provision by citing the principle of “fundamental change
of circumstances” under public international law.118 The problem, however, is that, ﬁrst,
this principle is not incorporated into the WTO Agreements, and the safeguard measures
available under WTO Agreements is not exactly the same as the traditional principle of
“fundamental change of circumstances” under public international law; second, even under
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), there are two condi-
tions119 a country has to satisfy before invoking this principle, and it is hard to say that the
conditions listed here for services safeguards satisfy these conditions. Moreover, there are
many practical problems of applying safeguard measures in services,120 and that is probably
why China has never initiated any services safeguard investigation so far.
Article 46 of the New Law deals with trade diversion. This article provides that, “if, due
to the restrictions a third country has placed on its imports, a product is being imported
into the domestic market of China in such increased quantities, and under such conditions
as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry, or impedes the
establishment of domestic industry, the state may take appropriate remedy measures and
restrict the import of such product.” Even though this article does not state exactly which
trade remedy measures the state might take, as the main consideration is on the quantity of
the imports rather than the price or the grant of subsidies, the most appropriate trade remedy
measure should be safeguard measures. This provision, however, does not ﬁt well within
the current WTO safeguard framework. First, under the WTO Safeguards Agreement, the
injury standard is very high: a Member can invoke safeguard measures if and only if there
is injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic industry.121 On the other hand, Article
46 does not require serious injury, mere injury, be it serious or slight, is enough. Moreover,
Article 46 is available even in cases where there is only impediment to the establishment of
a domestic industry, which is a standard even lower than “injury”. In this sense, Article 46
is much wider than the WTO regime. Second, under the WTO Safeguard Agreement, the
only thing that matters is the increased quantity of imports. It does not matter what caused
such surge in imports. Article 46, however, would only apply to cases where the imports are
diverted to China because of restrictions taken by a third country. From this perspective,
Article 46 is much stricter. Generally speaking, WTO Members are under no obligations to
establish safeguard regimes. If they do, however, they must make sure that their safeguard
regimes follow the WTO rules. Thus, the low injury requirement in Article 46 might be
illegal as it falls short of the minimum requirement of the WTO rules. Putting the question
of the legitimacy of this measure aside, it is interesting to note that this provision mirrors
the mechanism established under Section 16(8) of the Accession Protocol of China, which
provides that
If a WTO Member considers that an action taken under paragraphs 2, 3 or 7 causes
or threatens to cause signiﬁcant diversions of trade into its market, it may request
consultations with China and/or the WTO Member concerned. Such consultations
118 Department of Treaty and Law of MOFCOM, Interpretation of the Foreign Trade Law of the PRC, at 202.
119 Under Article 62 of the VCLT, two conditions have to be satisﬁed, i.e.,
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound
by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the
treaty.
120 See e.g., Pierre Sauvé, Ch. 7, “Completing the GATS Framework: Addressing Uruguay Round Leftovers”, in
Pierre Sauve & Robert Stern, eds., GATS 2000, New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (Brook-
ings Institution Press, 2000), online: <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Sauve/sauvegats.pdf>;
Mario Marconini, “Emergency Safeguard Measures in The GATS: Beyond Feasible and Desirable”, online:
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd20054_en.pdf>; Fernando Pierola, “A Safeguard Regime for the
GATS”, paper presented at the World Trade Forum 2006, Bern, Switzerland (on ﬁle with the author).
121 Art. 2.
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shall be held within 30 days after the request is notiﬁed to the Committee on Safe-
guards. If such consultations fail to lead to an agreement between China and theWTO
Member or Members concerned within 60 days after the notiﬁcation, the requesting
WTO Member shall be free, in respect of such product, to withdraw concessions
accorded to or otherwise limit imports from China, to the extent necessary to prevent
or remedy such diversions. Such action shall be notiﬁed immediately to the Committee
on Safeguards.
In the author’s view, this shows the bitterness China has against this provision, which
is apparently discriminatory and makes it much easier for other WTO Members to invoke
safeguardmeasures against China. Indeed, in its ofﬁcial guide to the new Foreign Trade Law,
China also cites, as a model for this provision, 19 USC 2451, which basically incorporates
Section 16(8) of the Accession Protocol of China into the domestic legal system of the United
States.122 Under the WTO legal framework, however, Section 16(8) would be justiﬁed by
Article XII of the WTO Agreement. It would be much harder for China to justify any
measures it might take under Article 46, unless it is willing to follow the strict procedural
and substantial requirements under the WTO Safeguard Agreement, which would make
Article 46 redundant.
Article 47 is another aggressive provision. Under this article, whenever a country or
region that is a party to a trade agreement with China breaches the provisions in such
agreement and causes nulliﬁcation or impairment to the beneﬁts accruable to China under
such agreement, or impedes the achievement of the aim of such agreement, China may
request such country or region to take necessary remedy measures, and may also suspend or
terminate its obligations under such agreement. At ﬁrst glance, this provision is very similar
to the highly controversial provision in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 USC 2411).
Indeed, China also cites as its legislative model Section 301, in addition to Article XXIII
of the GATT and Article 22 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). As Hudec has argued in his classical work on Section
301, the main problem with this type of provision is that unilateral retaliatory measures
might be taken under the provision without pre-authorisation for such retaliation pursuant
to the procedures of the WTO dispute settlement system.123 It is unclear whether Article
47 would fall under the same category as it does not explicitly state whether China can
take some unilateral action in reaction to alleged wrongdoings of foreign countries without
the need for formal authorization from the WTO. In either case, however, this provision
would not be of much use. On the one hand, if a unilateral measure is taken without WTO
authorisation, such measures would violate the WTO agreements and thus are illegal. On
the other hand, if China has to go through the WTO dispute settlement procedures before
any action is taken, Article 47 would lose its “teeth” and become largely useless. Thus, the
only effects this provision might have are symbolic rather than substantial.
(b) Protection of TRIPS: Chapter Five of the New Law provides another example of
China’s aggressive initiative in protecting its own trade interests. Entitled “Protection of
Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)”, this Chapter is cited by many observers
as a good example of China’s campaign to implement its WTO commitments and enforce
international intellectual property (IP) protection standards. In the author’s view, however,
such observations are largely misguided. Instead, this chapter aims more at the protection of
the TRIPS of domestic Chinese ﬁrms rather than those of foreign ﬁrms. For example, even
though the ﬁrst paragraph of Article 29 states that “the state shall protect TRIPS according
to the relevant laws and regulations on intellectual property rights”, the second paragraph
122 Department of Treaty and Law of MOFCOM, supra note 118 at 203-208.
123 Robert E. Hudec, “Thinking about the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil”, in Robert E. Hudec, Essays
on the Nature of International Trade Law (England: Cameron May, 1999) at 153-206. See also A. Lynne
Puckett & William L. Reynolds, “Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement under Section 301: At Odds with the
WTO?” (1996) 90(4) Am. J. Int’l L. at 675-689
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only focuses on trade measures that might be taken when imported goods infringe IP rights.
While both imported and exported goods may infringe IP rights, their effects are very differ-
ent, with imported goods typically affecting the IP rights of domestic products and exported
goods affecting the IP rights of foreign products. Moreover, it is an open secret that China is
now not only the largest producer of all types of legitimate goods, but also the biggest source
of all pirated products in the world. Thus, if China is truly interested in implementing its
obligations to protect the TRIPS of other WTO Members, it should focus more on the goods
exported from China rather than those imported into China. The way the current provision
is worded can only be explained by China’s hidden agenda to protect the TRIPS of its own
ﬁrms. Article 30 further afﬁrms this bias against foreign IP rights holders. Under this article,
if the IP rights owner engages in practices such as preventing challenges to the validity of the
IP rights in licensing agreements, requiring coercive package licensing, or including exclusive
grant-back conditions in licensing agreements, and such practices endanger the order of fair
competition in foreign trade, the Ministry of Commerce may take appropriate measures to
reduce or eliminate such danger. While both domestic and foreign IP rights owners could
engage in such anti-competitive practices, this provision is clearly aimed at foreign IP rights
owners because any such anti-competitive practices of the domestic IP rights owners would
not be subject to the sanctions under the Foreign Trade Law, which by deﬁnition applies
only to foreign trade but not to domestic business transactions. The next provision, Arti-
cle 31, goes one step further by stating that, if other countries or regions fail to provide
national treatment with regard to the TRIPS of ﬁrms or individuals from China, or fail to
provide full and effective IP protection to goods, technology or services from China, China
may take appropriate measures according to the relevant laws, regulations or any treaties or
agreements that China has signed. This provision is modeled after the Special 301 Clause of
the Trade Act of 1974 (19 USC 2242), and will probably face the same quandary of either
running afoul of WTO agreements or lapse into redundancy as discussed above with regard
to Article 47.
(c) Foreign Trade Investigations: China’s newly-developed penchant for trade protection-
ism reaches new heights with the addition of a new Chapter VII in the New Law, which
is aptly entitled “Foreign Trade Investigations”. Under this Chapter, the MOFCOM can
conduct investigations to deal with the following activities which affect foreign trade orders:
(1) the effects on the competitive strengths of domestic industries by the import and
export of goods, technologies and international trade in services;
(2) trade barriers of other countries or regions;
(3) matters requiring investigation in order to determine whether foreign trade remedies
measures such as anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures should be
taken;
(4) activities that circumvent foreign trade remedies measures;
(5) foreign trade activities related to national security issues;
(6) matters requiring investigation in order to enforce the provisions of Articles 7, 29(2),
30, 31, 32(3) and 33(3); and
(7) any other matters which may have impact on foreign trade order and require
investigation.
Such investigations are generally initiated by the MOFCOM with a public notice.124
Depending on the type of matter, investigations may take several forms, including written
questionnaires, oral hearings, ﬁeld investigations or entrusted investigations.125 After the
investigation, theMOFCOMshall issue a report ormake an appropriate decision, which can
be contained in a public notice.126 It is unclear what “appropriate decisions” include. If it
refers to bilateral consultation or the initiation of WTO dispute settlement proceedings, that
124 Art. 38.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
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should be perfectly legal. If it also includes the possibility of unilateral actionswithout formal
authorisation from the WTO, the “appropriate decision” could violate WTO obligations.
Amongst the investigations authorised under Chapter VII, the most important one is the
foreign trade barrier investigation, which can be a very powerful tool to deal with trade
barriers Chinese ﬁrms encounter in other countries. In order to provide detailed guidelines
for such investigations, theMOFCOM issued the Provisional Rules on Foreign Trade Barrier
Investigation in September 2002, which was further revised and promulgated as the Rules
on Foreign Trade Barrier Investigation in February 2005. Under the Rules, “trade barriers”
include measures taken or supported by a foreign country that:
(1) violate the trade agreements that such country has concluded with China, or fail to
implement the obligations in such agreements; OR
(2) cause one of the following adverse effects on trade:
a) cause or threaten to cause impediment or restrictions on Chinese products or
services’ access to the domestic market of such country or a third country
market;
b) cause or threaten to cause injury to the competitive strength of Chinese products
or services in the domestic market of such country or a third country market;
c) cause or threaten to cause impediment or restrictions on the export of products
or services from such country or a third country into China.127
Pursuant to the 2002 Provisional Rules and the 2005 Rules, the MOFCOM has issued
an annual Foreign Market Access Report since 2002. This Report describes and assesses
the trade and investment barriers in twenty ﬁve major trading partners of China, including
Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Thailand,
the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Russia,
the European Union, Canada, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Australia and
NewZealand. TheReport covers awide scope of trade barriers, which are placed in fourteen
different categories as follows128:
(1) Tariff and tariff administrative measures, e.g., tariff peak and unjustiﬁed practices
in tariff quota administration;
(2) Import restrictions, e.g., unjustiﬁed import ban and import licensing;
(3) Barriers to Customs procedures, e.g., procedural obstacles in customs clearance,
unjustiﬁed charges on imports;
(4) Discriminatory taxes and fees on imported goods;
(5) Technical barriers to trade, e.g., unjustiﬁed technical regulations and standards
applied to imported products, complicated certiﬁcation and conformity assessment
procedures;
(6) Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, e.g., unnecessarily strict quarantine require-
ments and procedures applied to imported products;
(7) Trade remedies, e.g., unfair anti-dumping measures imposed on imported products,
insufﬁcient transparency in investigation procedures of trade remedy, in particular
the abusive application to Chinese enterprises of measures designed for non-market
economy;
(8) Government procurement, e.g., insufﬁcient transparency, violation ofmost-favored-
nations clause;
(9) Export restrictions, e.g., extraterritorial legislation that restricts or impedes trade
between third countries, and unjustiﬁed export control measures in the name of
national security;
127 Rule 3.
128 MOFCOM, Foreign Market Access Report 2006, at 4, online: <http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/
z/ab.html/1>.
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(10) Subsidies, e.g., subsidies inconsistent with WTO rules that artiﬁcially stimulate
exports of particular domestic products;
(11) Barriers to trade in services, e.g., unjustiﬁed restrictions on access of foreign services;
(12) Inadequate intellectual property right protection, e.g., inadequate intellectual
property protection on imported products
(13) Unjustiﬁable protection of intellectual property right, e.g., restrictive measures on
imported products in the name of intellectual property protection;
(14) Other barriers, i.e. measures or practices with trade distorting effects other than
above categorized.
In terms of both format and substantive content, the Report follows closely the National
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE), which is issued by the U.S. Trade
Representative every year. As China has been featured high in the NTE every year, the
Report can be seen as a Chinese counter-attack, with numerous problems in the US trade
regime listed in the Chinese Report year after year.
With the introduction of the foreign trade barrier investigation mechanism, China has
started a campaign to aggressively protect and expand its trade interests abroad. This is
well illustrated by the ﬁrst and only foreign trade barrier investigation thus far, which is
on import restrictions on laver by Japan.129 In that case, the Jiangsu Laver Association
launched a petition in April 2004 on the quantitative restrictions on the imports of laver
imposed by Japan. After receiving the petition, the MOFCOM launched a foreign trade
investigation. During the investigation, MOFCOM held several consultations with the
Japanese authorities. In the end, the Japanese government agreed to open up its laver
market to Chinese laver producers. Thus, the MOFCOM terminated the investigation in
February 2005.
B. The Bilateral/Regional Level
At the bilateral and regional level, China has also become more aggressive since its accession
to the WTO.130 Historically, China has not displayed much interest in pursuing free trade
agreements (F.T.As) with its trade partners. Starting with the signing of the two Closer
Economic Partnership Arrangements with Hong Kong, China131 (June 2003) and Macau,
China132 (October 2003), however, China has gone on a shopping spree of F.T.As. Cur-
rently, China has concluded an F.T.A. with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) (November 2002)133, Chile134 (November 2005) and Pakistan135 (November
129 Fair Trade Bureau of MOFCOM, Selected Cases on Fair Trade in Imports and Exports, July 2006, at 87-95.
130 For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Henry Gao, “The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit” in
Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Report on Capacity Building for The New International
Architecture in Trade and Investment, March 2007.
131 The full text of the Arrangement is available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/ cepa_legaltext.
html.
132 The full text of the Arrangement is available at <http://www.economia.gov.mo/page/english/cepa_e.htm>.
133 The China-ASEAN FTA includes several major instruments: a framework agreement, and agreements on
trade in goods, trade in services and dispute settlement mechanism, respectively. The Framework Agree-
ment was signed in November 2002 and is available at <http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/af/ah/200212/
20021200055694.html>. The Agreement on Trade in Goods was signed in November 2004 and is avail-
able at <http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm>. The Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism was signed
in November 2004 and is available at <http://www.aseansec.org/16635.htm>. The Agreement on Trade
in Services was signed in January 2007 and is available at <http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/af/ah/200701/
20070104261073.html>.
134 The full text of the Agreement is available at <http://www.direcon.cl/documentos/China2/tlc_chile_china_ing_
junio_2006.pdf>.
135 The full text of the Agreement is available at <http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/af/fazzn/200611/
20061103845345.html>.
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2006), launched F.T.A. negotiations with New Zealand136 (December 2004), Gulf Coop-
eration Council137 (April 2005), Australia138 (May 2005), Singapore (August 2006)139
and Iceland140 (December 2006), with negotiations with Korea and India under feasibility
studies141.
In the author’s view, an aggressive F.T.A. approach is in China’s interest for the following
reasons. First, as a WTO Member with the world’s third largest trading volume, China
has more bargaining power in the regional trade agreement (R.T.A.) setting than at the
multilateral level. With the exception of ASEAN and Australia, none of China’s existing or
potential R.T.A. partners are its major trade partners. At the same time, however, China is
always one of the top ﬁve trade partners with these economies.142 Thus, while China can
afford to ignore these economies, none of them can afford to ignore China. This effectively
places China in a relatively stronger bargaining position.
Second, by focusing on R.T.As with those economies which are of minor importance
to China, China can divert some of the trade with its major trading partners, so that it
can further balance and diversify its import sources and export markets and would not be
overly-reliant on one or several economies. At the same time, these R.T.A. partners will
have a signiﬁcant proportion of their trade diverted to China. This would further increase
their reliance on China and further strengthen China’s bargaining power and political clout.
Third, with such asymmetric trade relationships and its enhanced bargaining position,
China can address in R.T.A. negotiations many problems that are difﬁcult to address at
the multilateral level. These include the discriminatory provisions which were discussed
earlier in this article. A good example is the issue of the market economy status of China
in anti-dumping investigations. One way to solve the problem is for China to request
the WTO General Council to amend the Accession Protocol. This seems highly unlikely,
however, given that the General Council works on the basis of consensus and so far the
only instance of consensus was when the Members decided in late July 2006 to suspend
the Doha negotiations. The other option is for China to negotiate with each of its trade
partners to recognise its market economy status. As China has muchmore bargaining power
at the bilateral/regional level, this strategy seems to be working. So far, 37 economies have
recognised the market economy status of China.143 As more and more economies recognise
China’s market economy status, there would be mounting pressures on those who still deem
China to be a non-market economy to do just the same.
As the multilateral negotiations are now in deadlock, more andmoreWTOMembers will
be shifting their attention to regionalism. Moreover, given its geo-political considerations,
China will probably continue to aggressively pursue F.T.A. negotiations in the near future.
136 New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement Frequently Asked Questions, online: <http://www.mfat.govt.
nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Agreements/China/0-faqs.php>.
137 See “China Completed First Round of FTA Negotiations with Six Gulf States”, online: <http://gjs.mofcom.
gov.cn/aarticle/af/ak/200505/20050500088391.html>.
138 “Australia-China FTA Negotiations”, Subscriber Update (26 May 2005), online: <http://www.dfat.gov.
au/geo/china/fta/050526_subscriber_update.html>.
139 China and Singapore to Launch FTA Negotiations, 26 August 2006, online <http://app.mti.gov.sg/
default.asp?id=148&articleID=4421>.
140 See “Vice Minister Yu Guangzhou Signed the Protocol to Initiate FTA Negotiations with Iceland”, online
<http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/af/ak/200612/20061203947215.html>.
141 Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, “Regional Economic Cooperation: New Ori-
entation for the Opening-up in the New Period”, 11 January 2007, online <http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/ztxx/200701/20070104250984.html>.
142 See data on the Trade Proﬁles Page of the WTO website, online: <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProﬁle/
WSDBCountryPFHome.aspx?Language=E>.
143 “37 Countries Regard China’s Market Economy Status”, People’s Daily Online (6 January 2005), online:
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/06/content_406523.htm>.
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C. The Multilateral Level
At the multilateral level, China, just like any other WTO Member, can participate in both
WTO negotiations and dispute settlement.
As the WTO makes its decisions on the basis of consensus, China’s participation in WTO
negotiations is important in shaping the future rules of the multilatera l trading system.
Both before and after China’s accession to the WTO, there have been many debates as to
whether China should take on the role of a leader of developing countries in the WTO.
The experience since China’s accession is rather mixed. On the one hand, China is a power
which no WTO Member can afford to ignore. It has continuously afﬁrmed that its interests
are aligned with those of developing countries and has been a core member of the major
developing country grouping, G20, since its inception in 2003. In his speech at the High-
LevelMeeting on Financing forDevelopment at the UnitedNations Summit on 14 September
2005, President Hu Jintao announced an ambitious foreign aid programme. This included
zero tariff treatment for certain products from all the 39 Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
having diplomatic relations with China, covering most of the China-bound exports from
these countries; forgiveness of the loans owed by the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs) and LDCs to China; US$10 billion in concessional loans and preferential export
buyer’s credit to developing countries to improve their infrastructure and promote mutual
cooperation; medical assistance to developing countries, especially African countries; and
training of professionals for developing countries within the next three years.144 All this
seems to indicate thatChinawants to take on the role of a leader among developing countries.
On the other hand, China has consistently taken a low proﬁle in all WTO activities. Be
it in the informal green room meetings, the formal meetings of the various committees
and councils or the grand sessions of the Ministerial Conferences, China has generally
been reticent. So far China has only been vocal on two matters: the annual transitional
review and the title of the Taiwan delegation. With regard to the former, it is China’s
own show and China must be more active in providing sufﬁcient answers to the questions
from other WTO Members. With regard to the latter, even though Chinese Taipei is,
legally speaking, a separate Member in the WTO, China has consistently claimed Taiwan
to be one of its separate custom territories and has asked Taiwan to behave accordingly.
After Taiwan’s accession to the WTO, Taiwan established a “Permanent Mission to the
WTO” and appointed ofﬁcials such as Permanent Representative, Minister, Counsellor,
First Secretary, Second Secretary and Third Secretary to the mission. China, however, deems
such titles to have sovereign connotations and asked the WTO Secretariat in early 2003 to
re-title the Taiwanmission as an “Economic and TradeOfﬁce”, just like those of Hong Kong
and Macau, and remove references to the diplomatic titles of the Taiwan ofﬁcials from the
WTO Directory. Normally the WTO Secretariat would update its directory twice a year:
once in April, and again in October. Due to the unbridgeable differences between China and
Taiwan, however, the directory was not updated since October 2002. Finally, in June 2005,
two months before the expiration of the term of ofﬁce for the outgoing Director General Dr
Supachai, a compromise was reached and the directory was updated. In the new directory,
Taiwan has retained the name of its ofﬁce as a “Permanent Mission” and the ofﬁcial title
of its Permanent Representative, but formal diplomatic titles of other ofﬁcials have been
removed. The then WTO Director-General Supachai also included a “Special Note by the
Director General,” in which he pointed out that the directory is only for the internal use of
the WTO Secretariat and its Members, and does not affect the legal rights and obligations of
any delegation in any way. Also, citing Article XII of the Marrakech Agreement, Supachai
recalled that separate custom territories which are not sovereign states can also become
144 For the text of the speech, see <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zt/shnh60/t212916.htm>.
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WTO Members, thus the title of the delegation of such a separate customs territory does
not create any implications of sovereign rights.
Even though China is now the third largest trading power in the world and is fast
approaching second and ﬁrst place, the author would argue, contrary to the popular rhetoric
of some scholars, that it would not be good policy for China to claim a leadership role within
the WTO for the following reasons. Firstly, the author questions whether it is in China’s
interest to be the leader. As a newly-acceded Member, China is required to undertake a lot
of commitments, many of which are more onerous than those of existing WTO members. It
is already a humongous challenge for China to try to implement these commitments. After
having been in the spotlight for ﬁfteen years, what China needs now is some quiet breathing
space. Shouldering a leadership role would put China back on the front stage again and
encourage other Members to pressure China to make more concessions. Secondly, even
if we assume that, arguendo, it is in China’s interest to be the leader, does China have the
experience and expertise to lead the crowd? Unlike other developing country leaders such as
India and Brazil, China’s experience in the multilateral trading system, even including that of
the accession process, is still rather limited. This may seem to have changed after the 1990s,
when the number of books published in China on WTO issues probably outnumbered those
of all other subjects combined together. This is just a false prosperity, however, as most
of the books are just introductory in nature and lack substance. The number of people
appointed as WTO panelists and Appellate Body members can also be used as an indicator
to gauge the level of a country’s familiarity with WTO rules. Excluding those from Hong
Kong, Macau and Taiwan, so far no Chinese national has been appointed as a panelist145,
not to mention an Appellate Body member146. At the same time, developing countries such
as India, Brazil, Egypt, Uruguay, the Philippines and Korea have produced many panelists or
even Appellate Body Members. Third, even if assuming, arguendo, that China does have the
leadership quality, would the other developing countries be content to have China assume
the leadership role? The author does not have a crystal ball to predict the future, but history
might offer some valuable lessons here. During China’s WTO accession negotiation, the
WTO Member that held on to the last moment before signing a bilateral agreement with
China was a developing country (Mexico). Similarly, in anticipation of the expiration of
the WTO Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), textile producer groups from many
developing countries signed the Istanbul Declaration Regarding Fair Trade in Textiles and
Clothing in March 2004 to request the WTO to extend the ATC for another three years,
presumably to fend off the threats of competition from Chinese textile producers.147 Thus,
if history can be of any guidance, it seems doubtful that developing Members would readily
allow China to take on the leadership role. This is entirely understandable. With most of its
exports being labour-intensive or resource-intensive products, China competes with rather
than complements the industrial structures of other developing countries. It is no wonder
that other developing countries view China as a competitor rather than a friend. Indeed,
notwithstanding that the Chinese government has repeatedly held that China is, and always
will be, a developing country, and in spite of the fact that the per capita GDP in China
is comparable to that of many LDCs, China is also the third largest trading power in the
world and the only one among all developing countries to be among the top ﬁve traders
worldwide. Thus, on many issues, China’s interests are actually closer to those of major
145 Even though China nominated in February 2004 three individuals to the WTO indicative list for Panelists,
none of them have been appointed as panelists in any WTO cases yet. See Henry Gao, “Can Chinese Experts
Become WTO “Judges”?” (May 2004) Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, at 49-52.
146 After the unexpected death of Appellate Body member John Lockhart in early 2006, China did propose two
candidates to ﬁll the vacancy. However, neither of them was selected in the end. See Henry Gao, “The WTO
Changes China, China Changes the World: A Review at the Fifth Anniversary of China’s WTO Accession”,
357 Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 22.
147 The text of the Istanbul Declaration is online at: <http://www.fairtextiletrade.org/istanbul/declaration.html>.
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developed countries than those of developing countries. Agriculture is one such example: as
China imports a large quantity of agricultural products, it is actually not in China’s interests
to follow the position of most developing countries and demand the elimination of export
subsidies. Trade facilitation, one of the four “Singapore Issues,” is another such example:
as China exports a lot, it is actually in China’s interest to push for the inclusion of trade
facilitation in the WTO framework to make the customs process more efﬁcient and cheaper.
With regard to dispute settlement, there have been concerns about whether the WTO
dispute settlement system can effectively cope with the challenge brought by China’s acces-
sion. On the one hand, the WTO dispute settlement system is a rather legalistic rule-based
system, which is regarded by some to be the “crown-jewel of the WTO” as well as “the most
important international tribunal”.148 On the other hand, China has long been perceived as
a country that deﬁes international standards, one that cherishes its hard-won sovereignty so
much that it generally shuns the jurisdictions of international tribunals, even though some of
its citizens have served or are serving as judges in these tribunals. Two more factors further
complicate the situation: First, unlike most other international tribunals, which normally
do not have compulsory jurisdiction, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) does enjoy
mandatory jurisdiction for the following reasons:
a) The WTO DSU is a multilateral agreement rather than a pluri-lateral agreement,
which means that all WTO Members must accept this agreement as part of the terms
of their accession to the WTO;
b) According to Articles 3 and 23 of the DSU, Members shall adhere to “the rules
and procedures” in the DSU, and shall “have recourse to, and abide by, the rules
and procedures” of the DSU in seeking “the redress of a violation of obligations
or other nulliﬁcation or impairment of beneﬁts under the covered agreements or an
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements”;
c) Thanks to the new “reverse consensus” principle established in Articles 6, 16 and 17
of the DSU, the consent of the respondent or losing Member is no longer needed for
the initiation of the dispute settlement process or the adoption of panel or Appellate
Body reports.
Second, as noted by the former Director of the WTO Appellate Body Secretariat, the major
traders are usually also the major users of the WTO dispute settlement system.149 For
example, the two largest traders, the United States and the European Communities, are the
most active participants of the dispute settlement system, while other major traders, such
as Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico and New Zealand, are also very
active.150 Even before its accession to theWTO, China was already one of the world’s major
traders, as well as one of the most important trading partners of most countries in the world.
Also, as China has yet to develop a mature market economy, there are many problems in its
economic and trade policies. Before China’s accession to the WTO, its trade partners could
only try to resolve these problematic issues through bilateral negotiations. After China’s
accession, however, they have every right to drag China before WTO Dispute Settlement
Body for any trade disputes. This has led to worries that China’s accession will result in
“a ﬂood of disputes [which] could overwhelm the already over-burdened system”.151 The
problem, however, is that “Chinese foreign policy is deeply state-centric and protection of
148 Matsushita et al., eds., supra note 97 at 18.
149 Valerie Hughes, “WTO Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future” in Gao & Lewis, eds., supra note 55
at 272-273.
150 Ibid.
151 Sylvia Ostry, “WTO Membership for China: To Be and Not to Be: Is that the Answer?” in Patrick Grady
& Andrew Sharpe, eds., The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater (Canada:
John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, 2001) at 263.
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sovereignty is at its core”.152 Thus, “[t]here is serious concern that China would likely
regard these actions as political and, to save face, simply reject the process itself”.153 If
China indeed chooses to reject or attack the dispute settlement system, the credibility of the
system would be seriously undermined.154
On the other hand, some other observers, especially multinational corporations with
experience in China, argue that that there will be very few, if any, disputes.155 The business
communities fear that their complaints will not be well-taken by the Chinese government
and they might fall out of favour or even invite retaliation by the Chinese government for
such complaints.156 Instead, “[t]hey would prefer informal behind-the-scene, government-
to-government talks so that some new deal could be worked out”.157 This would result in
a two-track trading system: “one set of transparent dispute-settlement rules for all WTO
members except China and another set of opaque bilateral arrangements for China”.158
Other WTO Members question the fairness of such arrangements and this again casts doubt
on the credibility or even legitimacy of the system.159
In the author’s view, this question is best answered by reviewing China’s post-accession
experience with the WTO dispute settlement system. As of January 2007, China has partici-
pated in one case as the complainant, i.e., theUnited States—Deﬁnitive SafeguardMeasures
on Imports of Certain Steel Products (hereafter “US-Steel Safeguards”) case; two disputes
and four cases160 as the respondent, i.e. the China — Value-Added Tax on Integrated
Circuits (hereafter “VAT Rebate”) case and the China — Measures Affecting Imports of
Automobile Parts (hereafter “Auto Parts”) case. In addition, China barely missed being
brought before the WTO in two cases, i.e., the case on coke export restraints and the case
on antidumping duties on kraft linerboard. In almost all these cases, especially in those in
which China was on the defensive side, China either chose to try to reach some amicable
solution before a formal complaint was brought before theWTO (in the cases of coke export
restraint and kraft linerboard antidumping duties) or to settle the case through private con-
sultations with the complainants rather than let the case go all the way to the panel and
Appellate Body levels (VAT Rebate). In the author’s view, this can be explained by the
reluctance of the Chinese government, especially the senior leadership, to participate in the
WTO dispute settlement process. According to Confucianism philosophy which is deeply
rooted in the Chinese society, litigation causes irreparable harm to relationships and should
be pursued only as a last resort, or, better still, as the great philosopher himself would have
preferred, avoided.161 To a large extent, the Chinese leadership is still unable to disentan-
gle the legal issues from political and diplomatic concerns and views the initiation of legal
disputes in the WTO as synonymous with the break-up of a diplomatic relationship. In
the author’s view, the active use of the WTO dispute settlement system is not necessarily
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 In the WTO, a single trade measure of a Member might be simultaneously challenged by several WTO Mem-
bers. Each Member is entitled to bring their separate complaint, which will be assigned a unique case number.
In order to ensure consistency and efﬁciency in the dispute settlement Panel’s examination of the measure,
however, the WTO normally would establish only one Panel for such dispute and the Panel will examine all
complaints in relation to this dispute. Thus, one dispute in the WTO might encompass several cases. See e.g.
Article 9 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
161 James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Volume One: Confucian Analects, Book XII, Yan Yuan, Chapter
XIII, “The Master said, ‘In hearing litigations, I am like any other body. What is necessary, however, is
to cause the people to have no litigations.”’ The full text is available at <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/
etext03/cnfnl10u.txt>.
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in conﬂict with China’s foreign policy goals; instead, China should adopt the strategy of
“Aggressive Legalism” to use the substantive rules of the WTO to counter what it deems to
be the unreasonable acts, requests and practices of its major trading partners. As argued in
an earlier article by the author, “the major advantage of aggressive legalism is that it turns
cross-border disputes from a difﬁcult political, trade or diplomatic issue that might under-
mine the bilateral relationships of the countries involved into a legal issue that is embroiled
in an intricate legal game. Instead of a sensitive issue that can be easily polarized by the
popular press, the question now has become a highly technical legal game that is beyond the
grasp of the lay people. If the Member wins the case, it was all because the politicians have
worked hard to achieve ‘real results’; if the Member loses the case, the lawyers, or more
frequently, the ‘incompetent judges in Geneva’ will become easy scapegoats.”162
There is no guarantee, however, that China will always be content to be bullied by the
other WTO Members. Indeed, an over-aggressive litigation strategy against China in the
WTO might be the victim of its own success: if the WTO dispute settlement system is used
too frequently, it might just turn itself into a catalyst for change in China’s litigation strategy
at some point. From some of the author’s recent interactions with MOFCOM ofﬁcials,
especially the junior and middle-level technocrats from the Department of WTO Affairs
and the Department of Treaty and Law, it would seem there is now a policy shift towards
more active participation in WTO dispute settlement mechanisms. One can trace this to as
far back as August 2003, when China started to participate in almost all WTO cases as a
third party. More recently, at the press conference for the 5th session of the 10th National
People’s Congress (NPC) on 12 March 2007, Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai indicated that
China would not hesitate to take cases to the WTO if bilateral consultations do not work
out.163 Now, it seems that even the top leadership has started to endorse the policy shift.
This is well illustrated by the recent dispute on China’s tax on imports automobile parts,
in which China seemed ready to ﬁght the case all the way up to the Appellate Body level.
This is in sharp contrast to the 2004 dispute on the Chinese export quota on coke, in which
China gave in to the threats of the EU to pursue the case at WTO notwithstanding the fact
that China had a perfect case from both legal and moral points of view.164 When China
hits on the path of “aggressive legalism”, the other WTO Members will soon ﬁnd that they
have to face a much tougher opponent than expected and it will be too late to close the
Pandora’s Box again.
IV. CONCLUSION
Due to changes in the political and economic environments, it has taken China ﬁfteen years
to be ﬁnally admitted into the multilateral trading system as represented by the WTO. Such
political and economic realities are also reﬂected in the legal terms embodied in China’s
ﬁnal accession package. Generally speaking, during its accession, China made much deeper
and broader commitments than most other WTO Members, especially developing country
Members. As the Chinese economy is resilient, however, the high level of market access
commitments in both trade in goods and trade in services will not have as signiﬁcant an effect
on the economy as people might have thought. Instead, the biggest challenge lies in the area
of rules, especially those discriminatory terms which almost downgrade the status of China
to that of a second-class Member in the WTO. Such terms, if used rather liberally, could
severely affect China’s trade interests, especially its export expansion capacities in foreign
162 Henry Gao, “Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China” in Gao & Lewis, eds.,
supra note 55 at 315–351.
163 The text of Minister Bo’s statements is available online at <http://video.mofcom.gov.cn/videocast/netcast.asp?
id=21>.
164 For a detailed analysis of this case, see Henry Gao, supra note 162 at 334–348.
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markets and greatly distort the world market. Moreover, if such terms are also imposed
on other potential Members seeking accession, there would be an imbalance of rights and
obligations among the older and newer Members. In response to these challenges, China
has become more aggressive in protecting its own trade interests since its accession. This
strategy is reﬂected in the actions it has taken at three levels: at the domestic level, China has
revised its trade laws and regulations to provide for more trade remedies tools for its ﬁrms;
at the bilateral and regional level, China has been actively pursuing F.T.A. negotiations with
many of its trade partners; at the multilateral level, until very recently, China has not been
very active in either WTO negotiations or dispute settlement. With better self-assessment of
its trade interests and deeper understanding of theWTOdispute settlement system, however,
we would soon start to see China become active in the multilateral dispute settlement system
as well.
